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ABSTRACT
This Article concerns an aspect of Article III standing that has
played a role in many of the highest-profile controversies of recent
years, including litigation over the Affordable Care Act, immigration
policy, and climate change. Although the federal courts constantly
emphasize the importance of ensuring that only proper plaintiffs
invoke the federal judicial power, the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have developed a significant exception to the usual requirement
of standing. This exception holds that a court entertaining a multipleplaintiff case may dispense with inquiring into the standing of each
plaintiff as long as the court finds that one plaintiff has standing to
pursue the claims before the court. This practice of partially bypassing
the requirement of standing is not limited to cases in which the plaintiffs
are about to lose on other grounds anyway. Put differently, courts are
willing to proceed as if all plaintiffs have standing as long as one
plaintiff has it, and they will then decide the merits for or against all
plaintiffs despite doubts about the standing of some of those plaintiffs.
We could call this the “one-plaintiff rule.”
This Article examines the one-plaintiff rule from normative and
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positive perspectives. On the normative side, the goal is to establish that
the one-plaintiff rule is erroneous in light of principle, precedent, and
policy. All plaintiffs need standing, even if each presents similar legal
claims and regardless of the form of relief they seek. To motivate the
normative inquiry, the Article also explains that the one-plaintiff rule is
harmful as a practical matter because it assigns the benefits and
detriments of judgments to persons to whom they do not belong. The
Article’s other principal goal is to explain the puzzle of how the
mistaken one-plaintiff rule could have attained such widespread
acceptance. The explanatory account assigns the blame for the oneplaintiff rule to the incentives of courts and litigants as well as to the
development of certain problematic understandings of the nature of
judicial power.
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INTRODUCTION
The fundamental principle of federal jurisdiction is that the
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.1 They must
scrupulously ensure that they do not exceed their rightful authority.
One limitation on their authority, as set forth in Article III of the
Constitution, is that the federal courts may only adjudicate genuine
“cases or controversies” and may not address abstract questions of law
or policy. The Supreme Court has gone so far as to declare that “[n]o
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federalcourt jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”2 The “case or
controversy” limitation has generated the elaborate doctrine of
standing to sue. To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must
have suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant’s

1. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–76 (1803) (holding a federal statute
unconstitutional because it conferred a type of jurisdiction not authorized by Article III).
2. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (emphasis added).
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conduct and likely to be redressed by the plaintiff’s requested remedy.3
The Supreme Court frequently reiterates the importance of standing,
calling it “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.”4
Despite the importance that the federal courts attribute to Article
III standing, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
developed a significant exception to the standing requirement. This
exception holds that a court entertaining a multiple-plaintiff case may
dispense with inquiring into the standing of each plaintiff as long as the
court finds that one plaintiff has standing. Courts sometimes invoke
this rule when the plaintiffs are about to lose on the merits anyway, but
courts also invoke this rule even when the plaintiffs might, and
ultimately do, prevail on the merits. In other words, courts are willing
to proceed through the litigation process and eventually enter
judgment on the merits for or against all plaintiffs, despite
acknowledged doubts as to the standing of some of those plaintiffs. We
could call this the “one-plaintiff rule” or, by analogy to the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction,5 a form of supplemental-plaintiff standing.
The one-plaintiff rule is applied with considerable frequency. It
has been invoked in more than two dozen Supreme Court cases and
probably hundreds of cases in the lower federal courts, and it has
figured in several of the highest-profile cases of the last several years.
Courts used the one-plaintiff rule in the litigation involving President
Donald Trump’s travel ban,6 the Obama administration’s “deferred
action” immigration program,7 the Affordable Care Act’s individual
mandate,8 climate change,9 and same-sex marriage.10 In King v.

3. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). In addition to the requirements of Article III,
there are also several “judicially self-imposed,” or prudential, restrictions on standing. See id. The
focus of this Article is constitutional standing rather than prudential standing, though the latter
doctrine does make an appearance at a few points. See infra Part III.E.5.
4. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) (providing that district courts may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over certain claims related to a claim within their original jurisdiction).
6. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 586 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated as moot No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10,
2017) (mem.).
7. For a discussion of the use of the one-plaintiff rule in the deferred-action immigration
case, see infra text accompanying notes 29–31, 143–51.
8. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519 (2012).
9. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
10. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Burwell,11 the most recent Supreme Court case over the Affordable
Care Act, the one-plaintiff rule may explain why the Court’s opinion
did not address standing at all, despite the fact that there were very
serious doubts about the standing of most of the plaintiffs in the case.12
After all, the one-plaintiff rule meant that only one of the plaintiffs in
King needed standing, and the federal government conceded that one
plaintiff probably had it.13 Due to its role in the King litigation, the oneplaintiff rule achieved the unusual distinction among standing
doctrines of having been discussed in the popular press.14
The one-plaintiff rule’s prevalence in judicial decisions far
outstrips the amount of deliberation the courts have given it. This
Article hopes to force a more thoughtful confrontation. It examines the
one-plaintiff rule from both normative and positive perspectives. On
the normative side, the Article aims to establish that the one-plaintiff
rule is wrong as a matter of principle and, further, that it is practically
harmful or at least not as practically beneficial as might be supposed.
Therefore, courts should stop using it. Commentators, who rarely
linger over the rule, should not endorse it.15 Instead, courts and

11. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
12. See Nicholas Bagley, Do the Plaintiffs in King Have Standing to Sue?, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2015), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/do-the-plaintiffs-inking-have-standing-to-sue/ [https://perma.cc/J8TT-LFUZ]; Rob Weiner, King v. Burwell:
Standing Pat or Standing Corrected, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 18, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2015/02/king-v-burwell-standing-pat-or-standing.html [https://perma.cc/48FB-FLLY].
13. The issue of standing came up at the beginning of oral argument, but it was not pursued
very forcefully because both sides, and the Court, seemed to accept the one-plaintiff rule.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (Ginsburg, J.) (stating that
“each plaintiff, or at least one plaintiff, has to have a concrete stake in these questions”); id. at 7
(counsel for challengers) (stating that “it’s blackletter law that only one plaintiff needs standing”);
id. at 39 (Solicitor General) (“[W]ith respect to standing, the question—the case or controversy
question turns on whether any of the four Petitioners is liable for the tax penalty for 2014.”).
14. E.g., Louise Radnofsky, Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Health-Law Challenger’s Standing
in Supreme Court Case Is Questioned, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/health-law-challengers-standing-in-supreme-court-case-is-questioned-1423264458
[https://perma.cc/P8BX-XWH9] (“Standing issues with these three [King v. Burwell] plaintiffs
don’t jeopardize the case, legal experts say, because only one plaintiff needs standing for the suit
to proceed before the court.”).
15. The most substantial treatment of the rule, which endorses its validity, comes from Joan
Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They
Are, What They Might Be—Part 1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate), 42
UCLA L. REV. 717, 726–50 (1995). Since that article was published, the one-plaintiff rule has
become both more entrenched in judicial practice and, due to other doctrinal developments, more
problematic. For a description of Steinman’s position and the impact of later developments, see
infra note 155.
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commentators should recognize that all plaintiffs in a case need
standing, even if all of them present similar legal claims and seek only
generalized injunctive or declaratory relief. And, importantly, one can
and should reject the one-plaintiff rule even if one believes that
modern standing doctrine has unduly limited access to the courts in
many situations, particularly when Congress has created new statutory
injuries.
Turning to the positive side of the analysis, the Article attempts to
explain the rule’s advent and general acceptance. Given the supposedly
fundamental importance of the standing requirement, it is jarring to
see courts treat it so casually. The situation calls out for an explanation
of how such a mistake could arise and thrive. This Article attempts to
provide one.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the oneplaintiff rule, the exceptions to it, and the history behind it. Part II
explores the one-plaintiff rule’s underappreciated harmful effects. The
problems with the rule are not merely theoretical (though, as far as
theory goes, the rule is unsound); rather, the rule assigns the concrete
benefits and burdens of party status to persons who should not enjoy
those benefits or bear those burdens. Part III then presents the case
against the one-plaintiff rule by showing that it is inconsistent with the
Constitution and the larger web of standing doctrine. Part III also sets
forth the right way for courts to handle cases in which only some parties
have standing. If implemented wisely, the rejection of the one-plaintiff
rule need not cause much harm to values like judicial economy.
Switching from the normative to the positive, Part IV attempts to
explain how courts could have fallen into the error of perpetuating the
one-plaintiff rule. The explanation assigns responsibility to the
material incentives of courts and government litigants and to certain
aspects of contemporary legal culture. The legal-cultural factors
include background assumptions about judicial supremacy and the
tendency, now manifesting itself even in lower courts, to elevate the
judiciary’s law-declaration function over its dispute-resolution
function. The same legal-cultural trends may explain problematic
developments in adjacent doctrinal spaces, such as the growing
willingness of district courts to issue nationwide injunctions that bar
the government from enforcing a law against any person, including
non-parties.16

16. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,
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I. THE ONE-PLAINTIFF RULE AND ITS ORIGINS
This Part provides some background on the one-plaintiff rule. It
begins by describing the rule, how it operates, and its pervasive role in
the federal courts today. It also discusses limitations on the rule’s use,
particularly with respect to the nature of the relief at stake. Finally, this
Part explores the rule’s genesis, which might best be described as
unintentional.
A. The Rule, Its Operation, and Some Examples
Standing is required in every federal case. In a single-plaintiff case,
that means the plaintiff is required to have standing, and the case will
be dismissed if the plaintiff lacks it. In a multiple-plaintiff case, a suit
may proceed at least with respect to the plaintiff(s) with standing.
According to the one-plaintiff rule, a court need not consider the
standing of other plaintiffs once one plaintiff is determined to have
standing. Further, the rule permits a court to proceed to adjudicate the
merits of the entire case, as to all plaintiffs, as long as one of them has
standing. That is the rule the courts have developed, and that is the rule
this Article rejects.
Once one becomes aware of its existence, one finds the oneplaintiff rule everywhere. The Supreme Court has invoked some
version of the one-plaintiff rule more than two dozen times in the last
several decades.17 In all but one of those cases, the Court had before it
both standing issues and merits issues.18 The one-plaintiff rule allowed
the Court to proceed to the merits after identifying one proper
plaintiff, rather than addressing the standing of all plaintiffs and then
resolving the merits only for the plaintiff(s) found to have standing. To
be sure, there are cases in which the Court, without mentioning the
one-plaintiff rule one way or the other, performs distinct standing
inquiries for multiple plaintiffs. This is particularly true in cases that

131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (observing this development and criticizing it on historical
and judicial-structural grounds).
17. The Appendix provides a list of the cases in which the Supreme Court used the oneplaintiff rule, along with some additional information on the cases. I included those cases in which,
once the Court determined that one plaintiff had standing, the Court stated that it or the lower
court need not consider the standing of other plaintiffs. The earliest Supreme Court case I
identified is from 1964, but the rule did not begin to appear with any regularity until the mid1970s.
18. The exception was Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2017),
which is discussed further in Part I.B.2.
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only address justiciability and not the merits.19 There are also multipleplaintiff cases in which the plaintiffs are identically situated for
standing purposes, so that they are most naturally analyzed as a
collective.20 But, to generalize, applying the one-plaintiff rule has
become the Court’s usual practice in cases in which different plaintiffs
present distinct standing issues. The Court has never directly criticized
the rule. The one-plaintiff rule has become so routine that it is assumed
on all sides.21
As with most rules of federal jurisdiction and procedure, the lower
courts have far more occasion to use the one-plaintiff rule than does
the Supreme Court. They have called the rule an “abundantly clear,”
“well-established,” “general rule” of federal practice.22 It is regularly
used by federal courts across the country, typically (though not
exclusively) in cases involving nonmonetary relief.23

19. E.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343–47 (2014); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–83 (2000); Gladstone Realtors
v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–115 (1979). There was a dissent in Friends of the Earth, so
the Court’s discussion of multiple plaintiffs’ standing might have been an attempt to bolster the
evidentiary basis for the standing ruling, in case the Court’s ruling was not persuasive as to a
particular plaintiff.
20. E.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 272–74 (2008); FEC
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22–24 (1998).
21. See, e.g., supra note 13 (quoting comments from both advocates and the Court during the
King v. Burwell oral argument).
22. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11th Cir. 2011) (“The law is abundantly clear that so long as at least one plaintiff has standing to
raise each claim . . . we need not address whether the remaining plaintiffs have standing.”), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Leonard
v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The general rule applicable to federal court suits with
multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need
not decide the standing of the others.”); Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 92–93 (D.D.C.
2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“It is well-established that a court need not consider
the standing of the other plaintiffs when at least one plaintiff has standing.”).
23. At least twelve of the thirteen courts of appeals have used the one-plaintiff rule. E.g.,
Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015); Tierney v. Advocate Health &
Hosps. Corp., 797 F.3d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 2015); McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764
F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 2014); Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 316 n.7 (4th Cir.
2013); Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 29 (10th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 182–83
(3d Cir. 2010); ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1195 (11th Cir.
2009); Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Leonard v. Clark,
12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993); Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 972 (1st
Cir. 1993); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv., 955 F.2d 1199, 1203
(8th Cir. 1992). I have not identified a relevant case from the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The courts listed above have not invariably followed the rule; for some instances in which
lower courts required all plaintiffs to show standing, see notes 47–51 and accompanying text. For
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Contrary to what one might suppose, the courts’ use of the oneplaintiff rule is not limited to cases in which the plaintiffs are about to
lose on the merits anyway. In such cases, one might be tempted to
adopt a “no harm, no foul” attitude. But the plaintiffs prevailed on the
merits in more than half of the Supreme Court cases applying the rule.24
In the lower courts too, parties who benefited from the rule sometimes
win on the merits and sometimes lose. There are too many lower court
cases to provide a precise breakdown of the proportions, but both
outcomes occur with some frequency.
Cases applying the one-plaintiff rule often state that, once one
proper plaintiff has been found, they “need not consider” or “need not
address” whether other plaintiffs have standing.25 This language makes
it sound as though the court is remaining agnostic on the standing of
the other plaintiffs, not ruling on standing one way or the other. But
such agnosticism is not possible, at least not for long. A plaintiff either
remains in the case or not. When courts apply the one-plaintiff rule,
the other plaintiffs remain in the case, and not only as an interim
measure while, for example, complicated jurisdictional facts are sorted
out. Rather, the other plaintiffs remain in the case as full-fledged
parties, which, depending on the case, might go so far as trial and
judgment on the merits or appeal and remand for further proceedings
on the merits.26 At least as a functional matter, and as the courts
themselves sometimes put it, courts employing the one-plaintiff rule
assume that all plaintiffs have standing and adjudicate the merits based
on that assumption.27
Courts easily slide from the erroneous proposition that the
standing of certain plaintiffs need not be considered to the even worse
act of proceeding as if all plaintiffs in fact have standing. Consider the

the relevance of the form of relief being sought and examples of cases involving damages, see
infra Part I.B.1.
24. See infra Appendix.
25. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 n.19 (1998) (“Because both the City
of New York and the health care [plaintiffs-]appellees have standing, we need not consider
whether the [plaintiff-]appellee unions also have standing to sue.”).
26. See, e.g., Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir. 2006) (“So
long as one party has standing, other parties may remain in the suit without a standing injury.”
(emphasis added)). On remand, the district court described the Eleventh Circuit’s decision as
having resolved issues of standing “in Plaintiffs’ favor,” and the district court then proceeded to
the merits. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (emphasis
added).
27. E.g., Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 44–45 (1974) (stating that “we assume
without deciding that [one plaintiff] does have standing” where another plaintiff did).
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Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Texas v. United States,28 the case brought by
Texas and twenty-five other states to block the Obama
administration’s “deferred action” immigration program. The Fifth
Circuit determined that one plaintiff state, Texas, had standing on the
theory that it expended funds to issue driver’s licenses to beneficiaries
of deferred action.29 Citing the one-plaintiff rule, the court deemed
Texas’s standing sufficient to proceed to the merits of the case as a
whole.30 But the last sentence of the court’s Article III standing
discussion stated that “[t]he states have standing,”31 as if all of them did,
which is a conclusion that was never justified or even examined. Other
courts occasionally slip up in much the same way.32
The effects of the one-plaintiff rule are heightened by the fact that
the rule is not limited to cases in which one could safely assume that all
plaintiffs would be found to have standing if only the court bothered to
conduct the analysis. Massachusetts v. EPA33 provides a good example
of a case in which the standing of the additional plaintiffs was
questionable. In that case, a dozen states, along with several other
government entities and a collection of environmental groups, filed suit
to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision
declining to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions.34 Before addressing
the questions on the merits—which concerned the EPA’s authority
under the Clean Air Act—the Supreme Court addressed what it
described as “serious” questions about whether the challenge
presented an Article III case or controversy.35 The Court did not
discuss whether all of the challengers had standing, but instead stated,

28. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136
S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
29. Id. at 150.
30. Id. at 151.
31. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
32. E.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb Cty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2008) (writing in a section
heading that “the taxpayers” have standing even though the court used the one-plaintiff rule to
limit its analysis to one taxpayer plaintiff); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v.
Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 226 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The Court finds that [one plaintiff] has
established standing to advance Plaintiffs’ claims.” (emphasis added)). For another example, see
supra note 26.
33. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
34. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). In this
particular case, the challengers had filed a petition for review of agency action, so they were
“petitioners” rather than “plaintiffs,” but that distinction makes no relevant difference for Article
III standing purposes.
35. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 506.
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in accordance with the one-plaintiff rule, that only one of them needed
standing.36 The one and only party whose standing the Court addressed
was Massachusetts, and the standing-conferring injury that the Court
relied upon was the inundation, brought about by rising sea levels, of
the state’s own coastal property.37 After discussing how Massachusetts
satisfied the standing requirements, the Court then concluded its
standing analysis by writing that “petitioners”—apparently all of them
now, as a group—had standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their
rulemaking petition.38 Turning to the merits, the Court upheld the
challengers’ objections to the EPA’s decision and required the agency
to revisit the matter.39
It is by no means clear that the other challengers in Massachusetts
v. EPA would have been found to have standing had the Court
inquired. The loss of coastal landholdings could not support standing
for all of the petitioners, not even for all of the states, as some of them
were not coastal. And the standing of the environmental groups was
even less certain. The Court’s opinion stated that Massachusetts, as a
state protecting its “quasi-sovereign interests,” was “entitled to special
solicitude in our standing analysis.”40 The opinion therefore provides
some reason to question whether the environmental groups, without
such special solicitude, could have established standing if they had been
required to do so.
The standing of certain plaintiffs was likewise questionable in
Bowsher v. Synar.41 In that case, the Supreme Court invoked the oneplaintiff rule to bypass the question whether members of Congress had
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act. The Court did so on the ground that
another plaintiff, a government worker who lost out on a raise because
of the Act, did have standing.42 Given that the legislators’ interest was
more institutional than personal, it was highly doubtful that they had
standing.43 One could provide many more examples of cases in which

36. Id. at 518.
37. Id. at 522.
38. Id. at 526.
39. Id. at 534.
40. Id. at 520.
41. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
42. Id. at 721.
43. Probably they did not have standing, at least not according to the approach the Court
used when it did directly address legislator standing in a later case. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
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the standing of some plaintiffs was questionable at best.44
Courts do not treat the one-plaintiff rule as mandatory. That is, I
have not encountered any case outright forbidding an inquiry into
other plaintiffs’ standing upon finding one proper plaintiff. There are
some decisions that mention the one-plaintiff rule, expressly describe
it as a discretionary option, and then proceed to analyze standing for
every plaintiff and dismiss plaintiffs who lack standing.45 Yet, if a court
does not have to consider the standing of other plaintiffs but does so
anyway, then its discussion of those extra plaintiffs’ standing is not
strictly necessary and, in that sense, is arguably mere dictum. In a few
cases, courts have indeed taken that position, deeming a previous
court’s holding on the standing of an additional plaintiff to be
nonbinding because it was unnecessary.46

811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act). See generally Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of
Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2015) (noting that the Court has repeatedly declined
opportunities to recognize legislator standing without definitively foreclosing it).
44. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing standing in King v. Burwell).
45. E.g., Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 F. App’x 795, 802 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[N]othing
in the cases addressing this [one-plaintiff] principle suggests that a court must permit a plaintiff
that lacks standing to remain in a case whenever it determines that a co-plaintiff has standing.
Instead, courts retain discretion to analyze the standing of all plaintiffs in a case and to dismiss
those plaintiffs that lack standing.”); We Are Am./Somos Am., Coal. of Ariz. v. Maricopa Cty.
Bd. of Supervisors, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1091 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“[The one-plaintiff] rule does not
strictly prohibit a district court, in a multiple plaintiff case such as this, from considering the
standing of the other plaintiffs even if it finds that one plaintiff has standing.”); see also Florida ex
rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1148 (N.D. Fla.
2010) (invoking one-plaintiff rule and finding that some plaintiffs have standing but then “for the
sake of completeness” addressing standing of remaining plaintiff and concluding that it also had
standing), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
46. In Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates,
459 U.S. 297 (1983), there was a question regarding the standing of the Director of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs to seek review of an adverse employee-benefits decision. Id.
at 302. The Court treated the question of the Director’s standing to appeal as open and further
held that it need not resolve the question because the injured employee was also a party to the
proceedings. Id. at 302–05. The Court acknowledged a few previous instances in which it had
granted petitions filed by the Director, but the Court did not regard those cases as settling the
matter of standing. Regarding one of those prior cases, the Court stated that “[i]t was not
necessary to consider the issue of the Director’s standing in [the prior case] because a justiciable
controversy was before the Court by virtue of the petition of the employer and insurer.” Perini
N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. at 303 n.11. In other words, the Court treated the prior case as if it had
silently applied the one-plaintiff rule even though that case did not discuss standing at all.
Another example of treating a standing ruling as unnecessary dictum comes from the
unusual case of Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). A prior Ninth Circuit
panel entertaining an environmental case had held that environmentalists and a bird had standing
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Although the lower courts have largely embraced the one-plaintiff
rule, there are a few lower-court cases that depart from it. As one
decision from the Sixth Circuit put it, “Our determination of standing
is both plaintiff- and provision-specific. That one plaintiff has standing
to assert a particular claim does not mean that all of them do.”47 In that
particular case, several plaintiffs challenged two different provisions of
a state law, and the court separately analyzed whether each plaintiff
had standing to challenge each provision, finding that only two of the
plaintiffs had standing and that they had it only for one of the
challenged provisions.48 Other Sixth Circuit cases, however, follow the
one-plaintiff rule without apparent realization of any conflict.49 The
confusion extends to the Sixth Circuit district courts: some of them cite
the one-plaintiff rule, but one district court within the circuit, in a
rather stunning decision, sanctioned an attorney partly because of his
repeated contentions that only one of his plaintiffs needed standing.50
Still, such examples aside, most courts treat the one-plaintiff rule as a
given—so much so that one decision by the D.C. Circuit reduced an
award of attorneys’ fees because the attorneys gathered standing
affidavits from multiple plaintiffs when, according to the court, only
one plaintiff’s standing had to be shown.51 Part of the value of this
Article is to make the one-plaintiff rule more salient to courts and
litigants, which should prevent such inconsistencies.

to sue. The subsequent panel treated the standing ruling as to the bird as unnecessary dictum in
light of the one-plaintiff rule. Id. at 1173–74. Although courts these days often give binding effect
to statements in prior cases without regard to traditional distinctions between holding and dictum,
in this case there was a strong reason for the later panel to try to avoid following the earlier ruling.
47. Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, 547 F.3d 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Pagan v. Calderon,
448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The standing inquiry is both plaintiff-specific and claim-specific.
Thus, a reviewing court must determine whether each particular plaintiff is entitled to have a
federal court adjudicate each particular claim that he asserts.”). Pagan was a damages case, which
may explain why it did not use the one-plaintiff rule, though the decision did not indicate that the
nature of the relief mattered. Both of these decisions cited language in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), as rejecting the one-plaintiff rule, but I do not
think Allen can be so read. See infra note 239.
48. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 614–15, 618.
49. E.g., Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015); Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t
of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (plurality opinion of Cole, J.).
50. Liberty Legal Found. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 12-2143-STA, 2012 WL 6026496,
at *2–3 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 575 F. App’x 662 (6th Cir. 2014). The lawsuit contended
that President Barack Obama was ineligible to serve as president, so there were other frivolous
arguments too. For a district court in the Sixth Circuit applying the one-plaintiff rule, see Poe v.
Snyder, 834 F. Supp. 2d 721, 732 (W.D. Mich. 2011).
51. New Jersey v. EPA, 703 F.3d 110, 115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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More common than express statements that all plaintiffs must
have standing are cases in which courts separately analyze the standing
of all plaintiffs in a case without mentioning the one-plaintiff rule one
way or the other.52 Perhaps this is because the judges know the rule is
discretionary and have chosen to analyze the standing of each plaintiff,
albeit without explaining their reasoning. More likely the judges just
did not think about what they were doing, perhaps because the parties
failed to address the one-plaintiff rule in their briefs. Again, part of the
goal is to bring the one-plaintiff rule, which often hides in plain sight,
out into the light where it can be seen and scrutinized.
The discussion so far has concerned Article III standing, but
versions of the one-plaintiff rule apply in other contexts too. For
example, courts have applied the same rule with regard to multipleplaintiff cases involving other justiciability doctrines. With regard to
mootness, courts have said that they need not decide whether the
claims of some plaintiffs have become moot as long as one plaintiff
retains a live claim.53 So too with ripeness54 and prudential standing.55
B. Some Elaborations and Exceptions
A few more details are necessary to complete the picture of the
one-plaintiff rule in operation. Courts apply the one-plaintiff rule in a
variety of contexts, without regard to the particular procedural
mechanism by which a case came to have multiple plaintiffs. Yet courts
have recognized some restrictions on the rule’s use, in particular by
limiting it to cases in which all of the plaintiffs pursue similar claims
and relief.

52. See supra note 19 (citing examples from the Supreme Court).
53. E.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 n.1 (2005) (stating that “we do not reach the
question whether the claims of [plaintiffs] Cutter and Gerhardt continue to present an actual
controversy” because other plaintiffs’ claims were not moot); see also 13B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3533.1, at 733 (3d ed. 2008) (“[A]s with standing, where it suffices to find one plaintiff with
standing, a live action remains despite mooting as to some parties so long as there is a non-moot
dispute between at least one plaintiff and one defendant.”).
54. E.g., Allandale Neighborhood Ass’n v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm.,
840 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to reach constitutional ripeness issues of other
plaintiffs where at least two plaintiffs’ claims were constitutionally ripe).
55. E.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984), it appears that the Court bypassed a
question of prudential “zone of interests” standing as opposed to Article III standing, but the
opinion is not clear on this point. Id. at 319 n.3. For a discussion of whether courts may permissibly
bypass prudential standing, see infra Part III.E.5.
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1. Application to Various Procedural Contexts. There are a few
different procedural routes through which a case may come to have
multiple plaintiffs or, more generally, multiple parties invoking federal
jurisdiction. For the most part, the courts have not distinguished
between these different contexts when applying the one-plaintiff rule.
At the district court level, several joinder rules can generate
multiple plaintiffs. The basic joinder rule, and the rule that provides
the most occasions for use of the one-plaintiff rule, is Rule 20, which
permits plaintiffs asserting related claims to join together in one case.56
Some decisions invoking the one-plaintiff rule arise from separate
cases that were consolidated under Rule 42.57 One might suppose that
courts would be reluctant to use the one-plaintiff rule when handling a
consolidated case that began as two separate cases, one of which lacked
a plaintiff with standing, but in fact the courts seem perfectly willing to
employ the one-plaintiff rule in such situations.58 The rule is also used
in the context of intervention under Rule 24, where courts have held
that an intervenor-plaintiff does not need standing as long as another
party aligned with the intervenor has it.59
In another variation on the theme, a similar rule has been applied
in the context of standing to appeal an adverse judgment, although
here the authorities are fewer. In Horne v. Flores, parents and students
prevailed in a lawsuit charging the state of Arizona with breaching its
duties to provide proper support to students learning English.60 Years
later, the defendant superintendent of education, along with state

56. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (permitting the district court to consolidate cases or take other
measures to effectively manage cases sharing common questions of law or fact).
58. E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719–21 (1986); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of
Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1465–67 nn.2–3 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Steinman,
supra note 15, at 728 n.31 (citing examples of consolidated cases in which courts employed the
one-plaintiff rule).
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. The Supreme Court’s most recent encounter with the one-plaintiff
rule involved an intervenor-plaintiff, but the Court did not find the intervention context to hold
any particular significance. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651
(2017); infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the case). Before Town of Chester, the majority of the courts
of appeals already applied the one-plaintiff rule in intervention contexts, though some had not.
See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 51 n.65 (3d ed. 2008) (citing majority and minority
positions); see also David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies,
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 726–27 (1968) (arguing that intervenors should not have
to satisfy the justiciability tests applied to original plaintiffs).
60. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
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legislators who had recently intervened in the case, moved for relief
from the district court’s continuing injunction on the basis of changed
circumstances. The district court denied their motion for relief from
the judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.61 The superintendent
and the legislators then petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court
began by addressing the petitioners’ standing to seek review and ruled
that the superintendent—a defendant against whom the judgment
ran—had standing.62 The Court then stated that “[b]ecause the
superintendent clearly has standing to challenge the lower courts’
decisions, we need not consider whether the Legislators also have
standing to do so.”63 The Court’s decision to bypass consideration of
the legislators’ standing is particularly noteworthy because the
legislators and the superintendent had filed separate petitions for
certiorari by separate counsel, though the Court consolidated the
cases.64 The Court ultimately ruled in the petitioners’ favor on the
merits and ordered the lower court to conduct a new inquiry into
whether to grant relief from the judgment.65
In contrast to the easy acceptance the one-plaintiff rule has won
in most contexts, it has been met with some resistance in the context of
class action suits that seek damages. It is not surprising that the oneplaintiff rule engenders more opposition when plaintiffs seek huge
damages from a private party than when they seek declaratory or
injunctive relief from a government entity that ordinarily tries to treat
similarly situated persons equally. The defendant facing a plausibly
meritorious claim for damages has a strong incentive to raise whatever
arguments might prevent certification or at least narrow the
membership of the class.
The question that has generated controversy in the class-action

61. Id. at 443–44.
62. Id. at 445–46.
63. Id. at 446; see also Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Program v. Perini N. River Assocs.,
459 U.S. 297, 302–05 (1983) (holding that it was unnecessary to decide whether a government
official had Article III standing to seek appellate review where an injured individual was also a
party before the Court); cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (stating that a party found
to lack standing to appeal could “ride ‘piggyback’” on another party’s standing, if that other party
had appealed).
64. See Horne v. Flores, 555 U.S. 1092 (2009) (mem.) (granting certiorari and consolidating
cases).
65. Horne, 557 U.S. at 472. The district court ultimately vacated its previous injunction
against the state, and the court of appeals affirmed. Flores v. Huppenthal, 789 F.3d 994, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2015).
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context is generally phrased as whether all the members of a class must
have Article III standing.66 Some courts, probably the majority, appear
to hold that the one-plaintiff rule applies in class actions, so that only
the representative party, but not all the class members, need have
Article III standing.67 Other courts appear to hold the opposite, stating
that all plaintiffs, including all the members of the class, must have
Article III standing.68 As explained below, the class action context
differs in meaningful ways from other situations in which the oneplaintiff rule arises, and many of the cases that purport to concern the
standing of class members do not truly involve Article III standing.69
2. Limitations Based on the Remedies at Stake. Courts sometimes
limit the use of the one-plaintiff rule according to the type of relief
requested in the case. The restrictions have been expressed in two
different, though partly overlapping, ways.
First, some courts and commentators have distinguished between
injunctive and declaratory relief on the one hand and monetary relief
on the other, restricting the one-plaintiff rule to the former.70

66. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, Ticketmaster v. Stearns, 132 S. Ct. 1970 (2012)
(No. 11-983), 2012 WL 441276; Theane Evangelis & Bradley J. Hamburger, Article III Standing
and Absent Class Members, 64 EMORY L.J. 383, 385, 387, 392 (2014).
67. E.g., Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015); Kohen v.
Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d
974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). When there are multiple class representatives, the usual oneplaintiff rule appears to operate among them, so that only one needs standing. E.g., Colo. CrossDisability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2014); see 1 WILLIAM
B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:8 (5th ed. 2011).
68. E.g., Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010); Denney v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d
326, 340–44 (5th Cir. 2013) (opinion of Clement, J.) (adopting this approach in a portion of the
opinion that was not joined by the other members of the panel). I refer to what the courts
“appear” to hold because it is unclear what these courts really mean and how much difference
there is between the supposedly conflicting positions. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 67, § 2:3
(summarizing the cases and reconciling some of the apparently conflicting statements).
69. See infra Part III.E.4.
70. E.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Brown, 567 F.3d 521,
523 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As a general rule, in an injunctive case this court need not address standing
of each plaintiff if it concludes that one plaintiff has standing.”); Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F.
Supp. 421, 437 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (“In an action for monetary damages, each and every plaintiff
must have standing to reap the benefits of judgment against the defendant. In an equity
proceeding seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, such as the instant litigation, it is customary
for courts to cease their inquiry once a proper plaintiff has been identified which satisfies the ‘case
or controversy’ requirements.”); 15 JAMES WM. MOORE & MARTIN H. REDISH, MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.23 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017) (“Only one plaintiff
must have standing to assert a claim. Therefore, once a court determines the existence of one
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Moreover, even when courts do not expressly state such a remedybased limitation, the cases in which the one-plaintiff rule is invoked are
usually cases involving injunctive or declaratory relief, such as cases
that seek to enjoin an allegedly illegal government policy or action.71
Although this Article argues that the one-plaintiff rule is incorrect
regardless of the remedy sought, it is certainly understandable that
courts would draw this remedy-based distinction. Any error in granting
generalized nonmonetary relief is harder to see than the error in
putting money into the pocket of a plaintiff whose standing was only
assumed.
Still, courts have not always drawn this money-versus-injunction
distinction. Courts have sometimes required individualized standing
inquiries in injunctive cases that would require the defendant to take
different actions for each plaintiff.72 And courts occasionally apply the
one-plaintiff rule even in cases involving claims for damages.73 Of
particular note here are damages class actions, where, as discussed
above, debates over the standing of class members sometimes
implicate the one-plaintiff rule.74
A second, and slightly more subtle, way of expressing a remedybased limitation on the one-plaintiff rule is to say that the rule applies
when all plaintiffs seek the same relief but not when they seek different
relief. That is how the Supreme Court described the rule in its recent

plaintiff with standing, at least when generalized equitable relief is sought, it need not consider
whether other plaintiffs also have standing to assert that claim. Of course, in order to qualify for
the award of damages each plaintiff must establish injury.”); see also Gladstone Realtors v. Vill.
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–15 (1979) (treating two groups of plaintiffs separately for standing
purposes in a case that potentially involved damages, without mentioning the one-plaintiff rule).
71. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 n.19 (1998) (applying the oneplaintiff rule in suit seeking declaratory relief holding Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional).
72. E.g., Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2017)
(conducting separate standing inquires where plaintiffs sought to have agency purge records of
their particular communications). But see id. at 218 n.1 (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (criticizing the majority for engaging in an unnecessary plaintiff-by-plaintiff standing
inquiry).
73. See, e.g., Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reinstating
a case seeking damages and injunctive relief where one plaintiff had standing); Laroe Estates, Inc.
v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying one-plaintiff rule to an intervenor
in a case seeking damages), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) (vacating and remanding for the court
of appeals to determine whether the additional plaintiff sought different damages than the
original plaintiff); see also infra notes 130–34 (describing cases awarding attorneys’ fees and costs
to parties who have not demonstrated standing).
74. See infra Part I.B.1.
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decision in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates,75 which ruled that an
additional plaintiff whose standing is uncertain “must have Article III
standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that which is
sought by a party with standing.”76 The Court did not attempt to
explain what exactly that means, though presumably the Court’s “same
relief” test would be satisfied at least in cases seeking “generalized”
relief, such as an injunction that bars enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute. But Town of Chester itself was a damages
case, and it is hard to know how the same-relief test applies in that
context. Is an award of damages the “same relief” when a second
plaintiff seeks to share in the judgment without changing the total
amount sought from the defendant? Or is it the “same relief” only
when the additional plaintiff seeks no money judgment in his or her
own name? That was the awkward position that the additional plaintiff
in Town of Chester eventually conceded itself into.77 Questions about
the application of the test remain unanswered, because the Court did
not apply its own test but instead remanded for the court of appeals to
figure out what exactly the additional plaintiff still wanted.78
It is not yet time to present the argument against the one-plaintiff
rule, but the Court’s recent embrace of this remedy-based test warrants
a brief preview. As Part III will more fully explain, the one-plaintiff
rule is incorrect whatever relief is at issue and whether or not different
plaintiffs seek the same or different relief. Town of Chester’s central
error is to forget that judgments are person-specific. That means,
contrary to Town of Chester, that relief to different people is always
different relief.79
3. Limitation to Common Claims. Courts sometimes qualify their
use of the one-plaintiff rule by stating that the rule applies only when
multiple plaintiffs raise the same issues, advance the same claim, or
challenge the same law.80 And, in practice, courts tend to limit its use

75. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017).
76. Id. at 1651. The additional plaintiff in this case was a Rule 24 intervenor-plaintiff rather
than a Rule 20 co-plaintiff, but the Court viewed that as immaterial. Id.
77. Id. at 1652 n.4 (noting the intervenor’s assertion that it sought only to “maximize [the
original plaintiff’s] recovery”).
78. Id. at 1651–52.
79. See infra Part III.A.
80. E.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 402 (1982)
(“Petitioners have not challenged the standing of the other plaintiffs and, therefore, even if
Pennsylvania lacks standing, the District Court possessed Art. III jurisdiction to entertain those

BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

500

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2017 11:16 AM

[Vol. 67:481

to such scenarios, at least when they are being careful. For example,
imagine a case that involves challenges to two related laws or policies—
Provision 1 and Provision 2—with three plaintiffs—A, B, and C.
Plaintiff A challenges only Provision 1, and the other two plaintiffs
challenge only Provision 2. In such a circumstance, the court would
probably feel compelled to determine whether Plaintiff A has standing
to challenge Provision 1 and whether at least one of the other plaintiffs
has standing to challenge Provision 2. If Plaintiff B is found to have
standing to challenge Provision 2, then the court would feel free to
dispense with considering the standing of Plaintiff C to challenge that
same provision. That is, the courts generally require one good plaintiff
per issue or claim.
The Supreme Court conducted such a fine-grained standing
inquiry in Lewis v. Casey,81 which involved multiple plaintiffs
presenting different issues. Lewis concerned the propriety of an
injunction ordering Arizona to improve law libraries throughout its
prison system and to protect inmates’ access to the courts, especially
for inmates who were illiterate, did not speak English, or were held in
lockdown.82 The plaintiffs were a group of twenty-two prisoners who
sued as representatives of a class composed of all Arizona prisoners.83
But only two prisoners, both of whom were illiterate or nearly so, had
been found by the district court to have suffered adverse
consequences—such as dismissal of a case—due to inadequate legal
resources.84
There was broad agreement on the Court that the district court’s
injunction was too intrusive and failed to give adequate consideration
to the state’s legitimate penological interests.85 The Court split,
however, over the degree to which the district court’s errors should be

common issues presented by all plaintiffs.”); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d
1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“For each claim, if constitutional and prudential standing can be
shown for at least one plaintiff, we need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs to raise
that claim.”); see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 44–45, 67–70 (1974) (employing
one-plaintiff rule in a section of the opinion where the same issues were presented by the
additional plaintiff but not in a later section of the opinion where the plaintiffs presented different
issues).
81. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
82. Id. at 346–47.
83. Id. at 346.
84. Id. at 358–59.
85. See id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the district court’s
remedy was “broader than necessary”).
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described as transgressions of Article III as opposed (merely) to an
abuse of its equitable discretion in fashioning relief.86 Both Justice
Souter’s concurrence and Justice Stevens’s dissent applied some
version of the one-plaintiff rule, reasoning that the Court’s jurisdiction
over the case was secure because at least the two illiterate plaintiffs had
a cognizable injury under even the strictest understanding of what
counts as a deprivation of access to the courts.87 The concurrence and
the dissent thought the case could then be resolved on nonstanding
grounds, such as improper definition of the class or the excessiveness
of the remedial order. The majority, however, thought that standing
had more work to do. In particular, the fact that an illiterate named
plaintiff had suffered injury did not suffice to allow him to obtain relief
for prisoners who suffered different types of deprivations, such as
prisoners who did not speak English, those held in lockdown, or those
in the general prison population.88 In response to the dissent’s
argument that Article III standing requirements had been satisfied, the
Court responded that “standing is not dispensed in gross.”89
The Court’s exacting scrutiny of the different plaintiffs’
circumstances in Lewis was probably triggered by the fact that different
prisoners were differently situated with respect to the deprivation of
legal resources, such that the necessity of a granular approach to
standing was especially apparent. One lesson we might draw from such
cases is that the courts generally will not apply the one-plaintiff rule
when doing so would obviously expand the scope of the case or of the
proper relief. But courts generally do apply it when, as the courts see
it, the case would proceed in the same way regardless of the plaintiffs
involved. The courts’ mistake in drawing this distinction, as Parts II and
III will explain, is that allowing plaintiffs to remain in a case without

86. See id. at 394 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that the Court would have been unanimous but for the majority’s decision
to cast much of its ruling in terms of standing).
87. Id. (“[T]here is no apparent question that the standing of at least one of the class-action
plaintiffs suffices for our jurisdiction . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 407–08 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[E]ven the majority finds on the record that at least two of the plaintiffs had standing
in this case, which should be sufficient to satisfy any constitutional concerns.” (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted) (citing id. at 356 (majority opinion))).
88. Id. at 357–58 (majority opinion). The Court further held that, given the limited evidence
of violations, it was improper to provide system-wide relief addressing the obstacles faced by
illiterate prisoners, though this last ruling was not based on Article III standing. Id. at 359–60, 360
n.7.
89. Id. at 358 n.6.

BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

502

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2017 11:16 AM

[Vol. 67:481

standing is always wrong in principle and problematic in practice, even
when all plaintiffs present similar claims on the merits.
C. The Rule’s Origins
It is difficult to identify the source of the one-plaintiff rule with
confidence. There are some judgment calls involved in deciding
whether a particular case is invoking the rule. Nonetheless, at the
Supreme Court level, the rule dates back at least to a handful of cases
from the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the early cases using the rule are
well known today, though for their rulings on the merits rather than for
their rulings on standing. The early development of the rule does not
show that there was any well-articulated justification behind it or
criteria for when it should be used.
The first Supreme Court case to use the rule may have been
Baggett v. Bullitt,90 in which plaintiffs challenged state laws that
required state employees to take loyalty oaths.91 The district court
upheld the requirement, but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that
the oaths—which required employees to swear that they were not
“subversive persons”—were unconstitutionally vague.92 The primary
plaintiffs in the case were university employees, but there were also a
few students, whom the district court had dismissed for lack of
standing.93 Of them, the Supreme Court wrote:
Since the ground we find dispositive immediately affects the
professors and other state employees required to take the oath, and
the interests of the students at the University in academic freedom
are fully protected by a judgment in favor of the teaching personnel,
we have no occasion to pass on the standing of the students to bring
this suit.94

It is not clear where this left the students’ claims as a formal matter.
The Court believed the students’ interests were protected as a practical
matter by the judgment for the professors, so perhaps that means the
Court saw no harm in leaving undisturbed the district court’s dismissal
of the students. On this reading, the Court affirmed the district court’s
apparently harmless dismissal. Yet the bottom line of the Court’s

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
Id. at 366.
Id. at 361–66.
Transcript of Record at 44, Baggett, 377 U.S. 360 (No. 220).
Baggett, 377 U.S. at 366 n.5.
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opinion says simply “reversed,” not “reversed in part and affirmed in
part” or “dismissed in part.”95 So the better reading is probably that the
Court believed it could simply leave the students’ standing in a state of
limbo. As far as the briefs and oral argument reveal, the idea that the
Court could bypass a ruling on the students’ standing was not suggested
by the parties. The appellants’ brief had a short section arguing that the
students did have standing, and it did not suggest that their standing
was irrelevant or could be ignored.96 Although Baggett has been cited
by a few later cases for the one-plaintiff rule,97 the opinion itself gives
no sense that it was attempting to establish any general rule of
procedure.
Several of the other early cases applying the one-plaintiff rule
were abortion cases, including Doe v. Bolton,98 the companion case to
Roe v. Wade.99 Doe involved a challenge to the Georgia abortion
statute brought by a pregnant woman, nine physicians, seven nurses,
five clergymen, two social workers, and two nonprofits that advocated
for abortion liberalization.100 The plaintiffs sought to represent classes
of persons similarly situated.101 The district court had dismissed the
claims of all plaintiffs but Doe, the pregnant woman, for lack of an
immediate controversy.102 The Supreme Court began by holding that
Doe had standing.103 “Inasmuch as Doe and her class are recognized
[as proper plaintiffs],” the Court then observed, “the question whether
the other appellants—physicians, nurses, clergymen, social workers,
and corporations—present a justiciable controversy and have standing
is perhaps a matter of no great consequence.”104 The Court nonetheless
went on to hold, contrary to the district court, that the physicians too

95. Id. at 380.
96. Brief of Appellants at 215–17, Baggett, 377 U.S. 360 (No. 220). The oral argument does
not reveal any discussion of standing. Oral Argument, Baggett, 377 U.S. 360 (No. 220),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/220 [https://perma.cc/WCG2-GNHF].
97. E.g., Allandale Neighborhood Ass’n v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm.,
840 F.2d 258, 263 n.15 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. Doe, 410 U.S. at 184.
101. Id. at 185–86.
102. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1052–54 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff’d as modified, 410 U.S.
179 (1973). The district court’s justiciability ruling relied primarily on Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961), which had refused to adjudicate a challenge to what the Court described as a moribund
statute. Doe, 319 F. Supp. at 1053.
103. Doe, 410 U.S. at 187.
104. Id. at 188.
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had standing. They were directly targeted by the abortion law, and the
Court would not require them to violate the law and face prosecution
in order to assert their rights.105 The Court then deemed it unnecessary
to rule on the standing of any more parties:
The parallel claims of the nurse, clergy, social worker, and
corporation-appellants are another step removed and as to them, the
Georgia statutes operate less directly. . . . We conclude that we need
not pass upon the status of these additional appellants in this suit, for
the issues are sufficiently and adequately presented by Doe and the
physician-appellants, and nothing is gained or lost by the presence or
absence of the nurses, the clergymen, the social workers, and the
corporations.106

The Court then turned to the merits. The district court had entered a
declaratory judgment invalidating several aspects of the Georgia
abortion statute but upholding other aspects.107 The Supreme Court
modified the district court’s ruling by finding additional provisions
unconstitutional.108
The passage quoted above cited Roe v. Wade, but Roe did not
invoke the one-plaintiff rule despite the opportunity to do so. In Roe,
the Supreme Court determined that Jane Roe, a single woman
pregnant at the time the suit was commenced, had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Texas abortion statute.109 Also
before the Court was a married couple, going by the pseudonyms John
and Mary Doe, who, like Roe, sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Texas statute.110 The Court wrote that “[i]n view of our
ruling as to Roe’s standing in her case, the issue of the Does’ standing
in their case has little significance.”111 The Court nonetheless went on
to address their standing and to determine that they lacked standing,

105. Id. In deciding to address the standing of the physicians even after Doe had been found
to have standing, the Court presumably thought that something was to be gained by doing so.
Some of the arguments on the merits related to the physicians’ interests in particular, such as their
interest in practicing their profession freely and without fear of vague criminal prohibitions. See
id. at 191–93.
106. Id. at 189.
107. Id. at 186–87.
108. Id. at 201–02.
109. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1973).
110. Id. at 127.
111. Id.
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and the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling to that effect.112 This
is the sort of situation in which the Court might have invoked the oneplaintiff rule and probably would do so today. The Court’s decision not
to use the one-plaintiff rule in Roe while using it in Doe does not seem
to reflect any particular thinking—in fact, “decision” is probably too
strong a word for it.113 It probably goes without saying, but the Court’s
attention in Doe and Roe was not centrally focused on matters of
standing.
Other early Supreme Court cases invoking the one-plaintiff rule
include the campaign finance landmark Buckley v. Valeo114 and the
housing discrimination case Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.115 Both decisions invoked
the one-plaintiff rule in a single sentence without providing a citation
to authority supporting it.116 Arlington Heights has often been cited in
later cases using the one-plaintiff rule and probably did more than any
other early case to popularize the one-plaintiff rule.
Although doctrinal innovations are generally assumed to spread
from the top of the system down, it appears that the one-plaintiff rule
was independently discovered in the lower courts. There are lower
court cases from the 1960s and early 1970s that invoke the rule without
citing any Supreme Court authority (and, indeed, there would have
been little to cite at that point).117 Like the early Supreme Court cases,
these cases do not reveal any sustained thought about why the oneplaintiff rule is permissible.

112. Id. at 129.
113. The district court had consolidated the Does’ case with Roe’s case. Id. at 121. One might
be tempted to believe that this explains why the Court felt it necessary to address the Does’
standing separately after finding that Roe had standing, but that is almost certainly not the
explanation. First, the Court’s opinion in Roe did not say anything to suggest such reasoning.
Second, it has become clear in the years since Roe that the distinction between one case filed by
multiple plaintiffs (some of whom have doubtful standing) and consolidated cases (in which the
plaintiff in one case has doubtful standing) does not make any difference to the Court when it
comes to the one-plaintiff rule. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 728. For cases illustrating this
point, see supra note 58.
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
115. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
116. Id. at 264 n.9; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12.
117. E.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 n.2 (2d Cir. 1960); Ga.
Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff’d sub nom.
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Norton v. Ensor, 269 F. Supp. 533, 536 (D. Md. 1967); see
also Alameda Conservation Ass’n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 1971) (showing
disagreement between majority and dissent over whether standing of all plaintiffs had to be
addressed).
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II. WHY THE ONE-PLAINTIFF RULE MATTERS
Part III of this Article will demonstrate that the one-plaintiff rule
is wrong. To motivate the normative argument, it is important to
appreciate why it matters that courts get things right. It should go
without saying that there is value in getting the law right just for the
sake of getting things right. But in this instance there is more, as the
one-plaintiff rule has bad consequences. Some of them are direct and
concrete, such as improper awards of fees and costs and confusion over
preclusive effect, which will be discussed in Section A. Other
consequences, discussed in Section B, are more indirect, such as
excessively broad injunctions and the stunted development of
precedent.
A. The Consequences of Incorrectly Granting Party Status
To appreciate the bad effects of the one-plaintiff rule, it is helpful
to remember two distinct functions of judicial decisions in our legal
system: dispute resolution and law declaration.118 A court’s judgment
resolves a dispute between the parties and thereby imposes certain
rights and duties on those particular people. In addition, courts can
issue opinions that establish, clarify, or otherwise declare the law that
governs like cases.119 A party to a lawsuit is affected by the decision
very differently than a nonparty. Everyone gets the decision’s
precedential value—subject to the limitations of the rendering court’s
reach and disputes over the meaning of the precedent—but only the
parties get the judgment that definitively decides their rights and
liabilities.120

118. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER &
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
73–75 (7th ed. 2015) (describing these two aspects of judicial decisionmaking).
119. Decisions can also resolve disputes without establishing law. Many decisions are not
accompanied by reasoned opinions at all, many judicial opinions are formally without
precedential effect, and so on.
120. See Stryker v. Crane, 123 U.S. 527, 539–40 (1887) (distinguishing between the force of a
judgment and the lesser force of a precedent). The rise of nonmutual preclusion diminishes the
significance of party status, but it does not nullify the distinction between parties and nonparties,
even in public-law cases brought against the government. First, nonmutual preclusion is not
automatic, particularly when asserted by plaintiffs, but is instead subject to the equities of the
circumstances. Second, even when otherwise appropriate, nonmutual preclusion does not apply
against at least some government defendants. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158–
59 (1984) (holding that it does not apply against the federal government); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 10–18, Demaree v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 13-307, 2013 WL 4782249 (Sept. 5,
2013) (showing circuit split regarding application of nonmutual preclusion against state and local
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The magnitude of the practical difference between being subject
to a judgment and being subject merely to precedent—that is, the
difference party status makes—varies depending on what kind of court
renders the decision. The gulf between parties and nonparties is widest
in the district courts, where most litigation occurs. District court
decisions are not binding precedent at all, not even within the district.121
Public and private actors within the district might choose to follow the
district court’s decision because they prophesy that a similar rule might
be applied in future litigation, but they are not required to do so. The
Supreme Court, by contrast, sets nationwide precedent. Because
officials generally treat a Supreme Court holding as conclusive for all
disputes within the holding’s scope, everyone is affected in
approximately the same way as the parties.122 Indeed, the diminished
stakes of party versus nonparty status at the Supreme Court level
probably go a long way toward explaining how the misguided oneplaintiff principle got its start. Nonetheless, no matter which court is at
issue, party status still matters. The one-plaintiff rule’s central fault is
that it elides the difference between parties and nonparties, thus
incorrectly assigning the benefits and burdens of judgments to persons
who should neither enjoy the benefits nor suffer the burdens.
Concrete benefits and detriments accrue to parties alone. A
winning plaintiff may enforce a judgment—perhaps, for example, by
pursuing civil contempt against a recalcitrant defendant—but
nonparties ordinarily may not.123 A judgment generally has preclusive
effect only against parties: a losing party is estopped from relitigating
the claims and issues resolved by the prior judgment, while a similarly

governments). Third, preclusion might be denied when a party seeks to estop the government
from relitigating a question of law (as opposed to fact). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i, illus. 8 (1982).
121. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011).
122. Cf. Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment on
the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 573, 574 (1981) (observing that
“Supreme Court decisions, in constitutional cases at least, are de facto class actions”).
123. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 223 (1974); cf. 12 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3032, at 208–10 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing Rule 71, which allows certain nonparty beneficiaries
to enforce judgments). In some instances, nonparties might intervene after judgment for purposes
of enforcement, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1565–66 (2d Cir. 1985), but such
intervenors would need to have standing. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 625 F.2d 33, 34
(5th Cir. 1980) (clarifying that Rule 71 cannot be used by a nonparty “to enforce an order in an
action in which [that person] has no standing to sue”).
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situated nonparty is not so bound.124 A losing party may appeal a
judgment, but nonparties ordinarily may not.125
All of the foregoing propositions, which depend on the line
between party and nonparty status, can be upended by the one-plaintiff
rule. It licenses courts to give enforceable judgments to persons who
lack standing and therefore should not be parties at all. Recall
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Supreme Court found that
Massachusetts had standing, employed the one-plaintiff rule to bypass
consideration of other challengers’ more tenuous claims to standing,
and remanded the case to the court of appeals for proceedings on the
merits.126 On remand to the D.C. Circuit, all of the petitioners remained
involved in the case on the same terms as Massachusetts without, so far
as the record reveals, any inquiry into the standing of the other
challengers. The D.C. Circuit remanded their petitions for review to
the EPA for the agency to take regulatory action.127 After the EPA had
not taken action for a year, the various petitioners asked the D.C.
Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the agency to act. The majority
denied the request, but it does not appear that the non-Massachusetts
petitioners seeking enforcement—parties whose standing remained
uncertain—were treated any differently in the enforcement
proceedings than the one party found to have standing.128
Further, the one-plaintiff rule sometimes leads courts to award
monetary relief to parties whose standing was never established. With

124. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34
(1982). Persons who are not parties to a case may be bound by the preclusive effects of the
judgment in limited circumstances, such as where the nonparty was represented by a party or
stands in a certain relationship, traditionally denominated “privity,” with a party. See Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008).
125. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3902.1, at 102–32 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the general
rule and its exceptions); Joan Steinman, Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not
Full-Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 411, 484–517 (2005) (same).
126. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521, 535 (2007); supra text accompanying notes 33–
40.
127. Massachusetts. v. EPA, 249 F. App’x 829, 830 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (remanding the petitions
for review in Nos. 03-1361, 03-1362, 03-1363, and 03-1364). Case No. 03-1361 was filed by
Massachusetts (the only party found to have standing) and about a dozen other states and
territories. The other petitions were filed by California (No. 03-1362), various environmental and
public-interest groups (No. 03-1363), and cities (No. 03-1364).
128. The panel majority did not write an opinion explaining its denial of mandamus relief, but
it appears from Judge Tatel’s separate opinion that the panel did not think that the EPA’s delay
was egregious enough. Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361, slip op. at 2–3 (D.C. Cir, June 26,
2008) (Tatel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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some exceptions, courts usually do not apply the one-plaintiff rule
when the plaintiffs seek damages.129 However, financial rewards accrue
to prevailing parties even when damages are not sought. A prevailing
party can sometimes recover attorneys’ fees, as in some federal civil
rights cases and environmental cases.130 And regardless of the nature
of the suit, prevailing parties are ordinarily entitled to recover the costs
of the proceedings (filing fees, copying costs, etc.) in the trial court and
on appeal.131 When these sorts of tangible benefits and detriments are
at issue, courts often realize that an individualized standing analysis is
necessary to avoid awarding fees or costs to a “prevailing” party who
should not have been in the suit at all.132 But, surprisingly, they do not
always recognize the problem, even at the highest court in the land. In
Horne v. Flores,133 two groups of petitioners obtained Supreme Court
review. The two sets of petitioners were represented by different
attorneys. The Court bypassed the standing inquiry for one group
based on the one-plaintiff rule, and the petitioners’ position prevailed
on the merits.134 The Supreme Court’s judgment awarded court costs
separately to both sets of petitioners, despite the fact that one group
had not been determined to have standing.135 Perhaps the Court
intended to treat the bypassed parties as winners, but I suspect the real
explanation is simple inattention.
The one-plaintiff rule also sometimes leads to improper awards of
attorneys’ fees. This has happened even in cases in which the plaintiffs
are separately represented,136 but it happens with apparently greater

129. See supra Part I.B.2.
130. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2012) (citizen suits under Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (2012) (civil rights). When fee-eligible cases reach the Supreme Court, the fees are
generally awarded by the lower court rather than being ordered by the Supreme Court itself.
STEVEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A. HARNETT & DAN
HIMMELFARB, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 854–55 (10th ed. 2013).
131. SUP. CT. R. 43; FED. R. CIV. P. 54; FED. R. APP. P. 39.
132. E.g., Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988); Women’s Med.
Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 512 F. Supp. 316, 319–20 (D.R.I. 1981).
133. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
134. Id. at 438, 446–47; see also supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
135. See Horne v. Flores, Nos. 08-289 & 08-294 (July 27, 2009) (issuing judgment).
136. In Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit awarded fees to plaintiffintervenors who lacked standing but whose positions were allied with separately represented
parties who did have standing. Id. at 163, 165–67. The court reasoned—incorrectly, according to
the argument of this Article—that the plaintiff-intervenors did not require their own standing,
and thus they could be “prevailing parties” because of their contributions to the case. Id. at 165–
67.
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frequency when the plaintiffs have the same attorney. That is, some
courts seem to believe that standing can be ignored even at the fees
stage as long as the party whose standing is bypassed shared an
attorney with a co-party who did have standing.137 Being represented
by the same attorney is insufficient to support an award of fees either
functionally or formally. As a functional matter, the need to represent
several plaintiffs rather than one can be expected to increase expense,
as the attorneys need to confer with more clients, prepare for
additional depositions, and so on. As a formal matter, fee awards are
not made in favor of attorneys but rather in favor of parties—parties
who then, as a matter of contract, may or may not be obligated to pay
some amount to their attorneys.138 Because parties are the awardees, it
is problematic for a party who lacks standing to be awarded relief.
Most of the discussion above concerns the problematic
consequences of giving relief to plaintiffs who might actually lack
standing. When a plaintiff whose standing is assumed instead goes on
to lose on the merits, one is tempted to adopt a “no harm, no foul”
approach. But that would be a mistake. Even when the plaintiffs lose
on the merits, use of the one-plaintiff rule leads not just to an error of
principle but also to practical problems.
The practical problems arise because not all losses are created
equal. The consequences for a losing plaintiff differ depending on how
the plaintiff loses. A failure of standing is a jurisdictional defect that
prevents a court from adjudicating the merits of a case.139 A dismissal
for lack of standing therefore has very different preclusive effects than
an adverse determination of the merits. In particular, a dismissal for
lack of standing does not preclude later litigation of the merits of the
same claim, provided the lack of standing can be overcome in the

137. E.g., Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 701–02 (9th Cir.
1996). In Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936 (9th
Cir. 2011), the court of appeals affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees to two groups even though it
bypassed the standing inquiry for one of the groups. Id. at 943–44, 951. Further, the court of
appeals granted the plaintiffs’ motion for fees expended on the appeal, again despite the absence
of a ruling on one plaintiff’s standing. Order Granting Attorneys’ Fees, Comite de Jornaleros de
Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936 (Nos. 06-55750, 06-56869) (ECF No. 125) (granting motion for
attorneys’ fees).
138. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 591, 597–98 (2010) (construing Equal Access to Justice
Act); Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87–90 (1990) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
139. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750–54 (1984).
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second suit.140 As one federal court of appeals explained:
Whether a dismissal is for want of jurisdiction, for failure to plead a
claim, or for the failure to prove a genuinely disputed material fact is
significant for more than technical reasons. A dismissal for want of
jurisdiction bars access to federal courts and is res judicata only of the
lack of a federal court’s power to act. It is otherwise without prejudice
to the plaintiff’s claims, and the rejected suitor may reassert his claim
in any competent court.141

Thus, for example, a claim that has been dismissed for lack of standing
in federal court may sometimes be brought in state court, where the
standing requirements may be more lenient.142
B. Indirect Effects of the One-Plaintiff Rule
The one-plaintiff rule has other bad effects too. In particular, it
can indirectly lead to overly broad injunctive relief and inhibit the
development of precedent that would clarify standing doctrine.
The problem of overly broad injunctions typically arises in cases
challenging widely applicable government policies. A recent example
is Texas v. United States, the case brought by twenty-six states to block
the Obama administration’s “deferred action” immigration program.143
The Fifth Circuit determined that one plaintiff state, Texas, had
standing because state law provided that beneficiaries of deferred
action would be able to obtain Texas driver’s licenses and the license

140. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436, at 149–179 (2d ed. 2002); see, e.g., Media Techs. Licensing,
LLC. v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Canadian
Universal Ins. Co., 605 F.2d 1340, 1342–43 (5th Cir. 1979); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (providing
that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction do not operate as an adjudication on the merits);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982) (stating that a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction does not preclude the plaintiff from asserting the same claim again). One might be
inclined to say that it does not seem so unfair to preclude from further litigation the standingless
plaintiff who is allowed by the one-plaintiff rule to proceed to the merits and lose; the plaintiff
initiated the suit, after all. Notice, though, that the same logic could be used to impose claim
preclusion against plaintiffs in single-plaintiff cases dismissed on standing grounds—but that is
not the practice.
141. Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1348 (5th Cir. 1985).
142. See Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 601–04 (N.J. 1991). In
Watkins, it was not entirely clear that the prior federal judgment should have been characterized
as based on lack of standing (or, at least, lack of Article III standing), but that is how the state
court regarded the prior judgment. See id. at 603.
143. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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fee did not fully cover the administrative costs of issuing a license.144
Citing the one-plaintiff rule, the court deemed that economic harm
sufficient to proceed to the merits with regard to all plaintiffs.145 The
court then affirmed the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining
enforcement of the program everywhere and with regard to all
persons,146 despite the fact that fifteen states plus the District of
Columbia had filed an amicus brief welcoming the administration’s
policy.147
Such an expansive injunction, especially at the preliminary stage,
was improper. The proper scope of injunctive relief—and in particular
whether an injunction may extend to nonplaintiffs—is admittedly a
matter of some difficulty in the law of remedies.148 But the better view,
because it respects the limits on the power of a single court and the
distinction between class and nonclass litigation, is that a court should,
as a general matter, issue injunctions that redress or prevent the
plaintiff’s injury rather than broader injunctions that bind the
defendant to behave similarly as to all other persons.149 Thus, a proper
injunction in the immigration case, and others like it, would have gone

144. Id. at 150. In addition to finding that Texas had standing under the driver’s license theory,
the district court also suggested there was standing under an “abdication theory” that apparently
applied to all the states. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 624, 636, 643–44 (S.D. Tex.
2015). The Fifth Circuit rested its standing decision on the licenses. Texas, 809 F.3d at 150.
145. Texas, 809 F.3d at 151. Indeed, the court mistakenly fell into stating that “the states”—
that is, all of them—had standing. Id. at 162.
146. Id. at 188.
147. See Amicus Brief of the States of Washington et al. in Support of the United States at
13–14, Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (No. 15-40238), 2015 WL 1611823, at *13–14 (Apr. 6, 2015).
148. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 276 (4th ed. 2010) (stating
that “the cases are mixed, even within jurisdictions”); Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but
Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017,
2030–34 (2015) (describing the case law as unclear and citing competing approaches); Michael T.
Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights,
Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 48, 521–38 (2016)
(raising concerns about wide use of “defendant-oriented injunctions” that require governmental
defendants to apply a ruling to all persons); see also Bray, supra note 16 (manuscript at 20)
(arguing that national injunctions are a recent innovation without support in traditional equity
practice).
149. In this regard, I agree with the views expressed in Josh Blackman & Howard M.
Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 249–50 (2016),
and Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III Questions in the Same-Sex
Marriage Cases (VII), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/01/understanding-standing-the-courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-casesvii [https://perma.cc/3TPH-TKHT]. Both of these pieces argue for the principle that injunctions
should generally benefit only the plaintiffs in a case.
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no further than necessary to protect the plaintiff state(s) that the court
found to have standing. If Texas were the only plaintiff found to have
standing, the preliminary injunction should have protected only Texas
from the immigration policy.150
To be clear, the excessively broad scope of the injunction in the
“deferred action” case did not flow exclusively from use of the oneplaintiff rule. After all, the district court issued and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed an injunction that applied across the whole country, not just
in the twenty-six plaintiff states, and that prevented anyone from
benefiting from the policy, even persons who could not burden Texas
or any other plaintiff state. Therefore, it is possible that the district
court might have issued a universal injunction even if Texas had sued
as a lone plaintiff and the court made no assumptions about other
states. So the error may go beyond just embracing the one-plaintiff
rule.
Still, if the courts were required to conduct a plaintiff-by-plaintiff
inquiry, it is at least plausible that the injunction would have been
narrower in this case and others like it. That is especially true if some
of the plaintiff states would, upon inquiry, be dismissed for lack of
standing.151 But even if most or all of the plaintiff states would have
been found to have standing, the need to undertake a more rigorous
standing inquiry might have forced the court to think about how to
protect the interests of the particular plaintiff states and of their sister
states who disagreed with them, rather than thinking of the prevailing
party as “the states” en bloc. The issuance of nationwide injunctions by
district courts and the widespread use of the one-plaintiff rule reveal
some similar assumptions or misconceptions about the nature of
judicial power;152 more granular thinking about standing could thus be

150. Perhaps there would be administrative difficulties in temporarily having different
policies in effect in different states, but it should have been up to the federal government to decide
whether it valued the partial implementation of its policy enough to outweigh the administrative
inconvenience of separate regimes. For its part, the federal government argued for limiting the
injunction, so the government evidently thought it was possible to apply the policy in some states
but not others, at least for a time. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 187.
151. As for the license-cost theory, which is the theory the Fifth Circuit adopted, it appears
that some of the plaintiff states already offered driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants
without suffering any financial detriment. See Amicus Brief of the States of Washington et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 5, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL
922867, at *5. There were, of course, other potential theories of standing, though all of them were
questionable.
152. See infra Part IV.
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expected to foster more restrained use of remedies generally.
In addition, the one-plaintiff rule has consequences for the
development of precedent. In particular, pretermitting standing means
that certain questions of standing, difficult ones most especially, are not
resolved. For example, the doctrine of congressional standing could
have been clarified earlier, sparing the lower courts more than a decade
of missteps, had the Court been required to address it in Bowsher v.
Synar rather than sidestepping it after finding one good nonlegislator
plaintiff.153 It may be that decisions on standing are sufficiently fact
specific, or ideologically manipulable, that precedent is not as
systemically valuable in this context as in others, but presumably the
creation of precedent has at least some value.154
III. WHY THE ONE-PLAINTIFF RULE IS WRONG—AND WHAT
COURTS SHOULD DO INSTEAD
Courts often repeat the one-plaintiff rule but rarely offer any
justification for it, and scholarly commentary on the issue is rare. To
the extent that there is a prevailing view of the rule’s propriety in the
sparse literature on the topic, it endorses the rule.155 That view is

153. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (pretermitting a question of
congressional standing), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–30 (1997) (holding that members
of Congress lacked standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act), and id. at 816–17, 820 n.4 (rejecting
the D.C. Circuit’s existing case law on legislator standing).
154. If it is unnecessary to rule on the standing of additional parties once one plaintiff has
been found to have standing, then those additional rulings are arguably dicta. See supra note 46
and accompanying text. My argument, of course, is that it is necessary to rule on the standing of
all plaintiffs because, for the reasons stated in Part III, the one-plaintiff rule is wrong.
155. The most extensive treatment of the permissibility of the one-plaintiff rule of which I am
aware is that of Professor Steinman, supra note 15. Steinman focuses on the procedural effects of
consolidating cases under Rule 42, but incident to that discussion she also considers joinder of
plaintiffs under Rule 20. See, e.g., id. at 737–38. Steinman concludes that the one-plaintiff rule (or
the “look only for one good plaintiff” rule, as she calls it) is consistent with Article III, the Rules
Enabling Act, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 726–50. To the extent that allowing
plaintiffs without standing to proceed to judgment would cause later difficulties, she indicates that
collateral challenges may provide a partial response. Id. at 730–31. I am reluctant to disagree with
Professor Steinman, but I note that she wrote without the benefit of later developments like Steel
Co. and DaimlerChrysler. See infra Part III.A. I believe those developments have further
undermined the one-plaintiff rule, though I would say it was wrong as a matter of first principles
even before.
I note as well that a recent article by Erik Zimmerman endorses the one-plaintiff rule as
support for his argument that a plaintiff should be allowed to assert multiple claims without
possessing standing for each claim, especially in the context of decisions about whether invalid
portions of statutes are severable. Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental Standing for Severability,
109 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 337–38 (2015); see also infra note 257 (discussing Zimmerman’s position).
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mistaken. The one-plaintiff rule is unlawful, and it should be rejected.
It is tempting to view the validity of the one-plaintiff rule as pitting
a pragmatic case for the rule against a formalist argument rejecting it.
And there is indeed some truth to that characterization. The argument
in favor of the one-plaintiff rule, to the extent it is articulated at all, is
mostly driven by functional or pragmatic considerations such as judicial
economy. The case against the one-plaintiff rule emphasizes Article
III’s limits. Nonetheless, it is an oversimplification to cast the dispute
as a stark conflict between formalism and functionalism. The case
against the one-plaintiff rule draws on some functional considerations,
and the case for the one-plaintiff rule obviously tries to show that the
rule satisfies constitutional requirements.
Before making the argument against the one-plaintiff rule, it is
worth acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s law of standing
remains controversial and contested. The scholarly literature contains
some powerful indictments of the Court’s jurisprudence and, in
particular, its requirement of personalized injury in fact.156 My own
sympathies lie with an approach to Article III standing that is
somewhat more pragmatic and generous than the approach the Court
now embraces, especially in cases in which Congress has tried to
identify previously noncognizable harms and create statutory
remedies. But none of that unease with the current doctrine affects the
argument against the one-plaintiff rule: even if standing should be
somewhat looser, all plaintiffs in a case still need it. Although the
Court’s approach to standing may well change at the margins as the
Court’s personnel and priorities shift, the Court’s approach is unlikely
to liberalize in the radical way that would be necessary to legitimize the
one-plaintiff rule, which, when properly understood, is a major
departure from the fundamentals of standing.157

156. See generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988);
James E. Pfander, Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493
(2017); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). But see generally Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does
History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (defending standing doctrine
against some historical criticisms).
157. The Court has shown unanimous support for the proposition that a party must have
standing for each claim it wishes to litigate. See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. Even
if the Court took the highly unlikely step of eliminating standing as a separate constitutional
requirement and instead treated standing as a question of whether a particular party has a cause
of action, cf. Fletcher, supra note 156 (urging such an approach), that probably would not justify
the one-plaintiff rule. That one plaintiff has a cause of action would not seem to justify allowing
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This Part’s argument against the one-plaintiff rule has several
components, so an outline of the argument may be helpful. Section A
provides the core of the argument that the Constitution requires all
plaintiffs in a federal case to have standing. Section B takes on the
economy-based justification for the one-plaintiff rule and shows that it
fails on its own terms. Section C explains why courts cannot defer
matters of standing until the remedial stage of a case. Section D argues
that stare decisis cannot save the one-plaintiff rule. Section E sets out
the correct way for courts to deal with standing in multiple-plaintiff
cases.
A. The Case Against the One-Plaintiff Rule
This Section begins by explaining why the one-plaintiff rule is
inconsistent with the nature of Article III judicial power. It then goes
on to explain that a plaintiff’s lack of standing cannot be overcome
through party-joinder rules or concepts of supplemental standing, nor
can judicial economy justify bypassing standing.
1. Article III Standing and the Nature of Judicial Judgments.
Article III vests the federal courts with the “judicial power” and limits
that power to the adjudication of certain “cases” and
“controversies.”158 This rather sparse text has generated a bevy of
doctrines intended to keep the federal courts within their “proper—
and properly limited—role.”159 Probably chief among these limitations
on judicial power is the doctrine of constitutional standing. As the
Supreme Court has explained:
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled
to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular
issues. . . . In its constitutional dimension, standing imports
justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a “case or
controversy” between himself and the defendant within the meaning
of Art. III.160

To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have suffered an

a co-plaintiff without one to proceed to judgment. Cf. infra text accompanying note 288 (making
similar point in the context of the “zone of interests” doctrine). The development of standing as
a nonmerits threshold doctrine may have, perversely, allowed the one-plaintiff rule’s rise.
158. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
159. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
160. Id. For the subconstitutional, or “prudential,” aspects of standing, see infra Part III.E.5.
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injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant’s conduct and likely to
be redressed by the plaintiff’s requested remedy.161
The Supreme Court usually presents its constitutional standing
jurisprudence as an interpretation and elaboration of the “case or
controversy” language, but for present purposes the “judicial power”
language to which it is wedded probably provides the best lens through
which to perceive the one-plaintiff rule’s faults. The requirement of
standing (along with other constitutional justiciability doctrines)
ensures that the federal courts exercise only properly judicial power.
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc.,162 the Court articulated this relationship
between standing and judicial power:
The power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the
authority of governments, this Court said 90 years ago, “is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy.” Otherwise, the power “is not judicial
. . . in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution
to the courts of the United States.”
As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock requirement, this
Court has always required that a litigant have “standing” to challenge
the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.163

The further requirement that every plaintiff in a case possess
standing derives from the nature of judicial judgments. The judicial
power is a power to issue dispositive judgments in cases over which the
courts have jurisdiction.164 Judgments are specific to the parties before
the court. The judgment resolving a case establishes the parties’ rights
and duties: D owes P the sum of $100,000, D has violated the due
process rights of P1 and P2 and is enjoined from doing so further, etc.
The judgment may be accompanied by an opinion that may establish
law for future cases. The decision’s precedential value, if any, is
available to everyone. But the parties get the judgment that definitively

161. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
162. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464 (1982).
163. Id. at 471 (citations omitted) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143
U.S. 339, 345 (1982); and then quoting United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 48 (1852));
see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (describing the judicial power as “the
right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants”).
164. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217–25 (1995); William Baude, The
Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1815–31 (2008).
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decides their rights and liabilities.165 The one-plaintiff rule’s crucial
error is that it overlooks the person-specific nature of judgments and
thereby elides the difference between parties and nonparties.
This error is on display in the Supreme Court’s most recent
engagement with the one-plaintiff rule, Town of Chester v. Laroe
Estates. As noted above, the Supreme Court ruled that the
determination of whether an additional plaintiff needs to have standing
depends on whether that plaintiff seeks relief that is “different from
that which is sought by a party with standing.”166 In addition to the
considerable difficulties inherent in trying to decide whether relief is
the same or different—which the Court left for the court of appeals to
sort out on remand—the question itself is founded on a mistake. Relief
for different people is necessarily different relief because it changes the
(again, person-specific) judgment in the case. Someone without
standing is not a proper party to invoke the judicial—that is, judgmentissuing, rights-determining—power and therefore should not receive
any judgment, even if “only” for nonmonetary relief like a declaration
of unconstitutionality or for a joint money judgment. The Court in
Town of Chester did not try to grapple with any of this but instead
issued a short opinion that relied largely on the parties’ purported
agreement with the basic idea of the one-plaintiff rule and remedybased distinctions implicit in the existing case law.167
To the extent that one could reconcile the one-plaintiff rule with
the demands of Article III, the most plausible argument would be that
a federal court’s authority extends to the entire case or controversy

165. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“The Art. III judicial power exists only to
redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s
judgment may benefit others collaterally.”); Stryker v. Crane, 123 U.S. 527, 539–40 (1887)
(distinguishing between the force of a judgment and the lesser force of a precedent); Judgment,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A court’s final determination of the rights and
obligations of the parties in a case.”). To say that judgments apply only to specific persons does
not mean that the judgment must individually name them; on the contrary, a judgment can
describe them, as in class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3); 1 A.C. FREEMAN, TREATISE OF
THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 950–54 (Edward W. Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925). Note that we are not
concerned here with judgments in rem, which are traditionally said to determine ownership of an
item of property as against the whole world.
166. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017); supra Part I.B.2.
167. Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1651–52. One virtue of relying on party concessions, one
hopes, is that doing so makes it easier for the Court to change course in a future case. In the spirit
of full disclosure, I note that I submitted an amicus brief in Town of Chester. The brief argued
that the case could be resolved on narrow grounds (similar to those the Court relied on) but also
urged the Court to rethink its one-plaintiff doctrine more generally, which the Court did not do.
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before it, so that once one plaintiff with standing creates an Article III
case, other plaintiffs, with or without standing, may join the case
without violating Article III. That is, one could envision a doctrine of
“supplemental standing” as an analogue to the supplemental subjectmatter jurisdiction recognized in cases such as United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs168 and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
But that theory of supplemental standing does not work. As a
practical matter, an obvious sign of trouble is that the theory could
license the joinder of innumerable interested-but-uninjured plaintiffs
who disfavor the same law or action. And as a matter of constitutional
text and principle, standingless plaintiffs are impermissible because the
thing that extends to an entire case is the Article III judicial power.
Whatever claims and parties a case may encompass, a federal court can
only deal with them judicially. To be a federal plaintiff invoking the
judicial power is to aim at the goal of a favorable judicial judgment:
that is what a plaintiff’s complaint must demand, and an enforceable
judgment granting relief and backed by the power of the United States
is what a successful plaintiff receives.169 Given that judgments operate
for and against specific people, it follows that each person invoking this
judgment-issuing power must have standing.
That is the core of the Article III case against the one-plaintiff
rule. To flesh out the case and respond to counterarguments, it is
necessary to consider the role of joinder rules and supplemental
jurisdiction in defining the scope of a case, the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction, and the potential relevance of judicial economy. The
following subsections turn to those tasks.
2. The Relationship Between Joinder Rules, Supplemental
Jurisdiction, and the One-Plaintiff Rule. The liberal joinder rules of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, combined with the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction, can expand judicial power beyond those
plaintiffs and claims that can enter federal court on their own.
Nonetheless, none of these rules or doctrines can extend constitutional
standing to a plaintiff who would not have standing if suing alone.
Consider the following scenario. A person with an intense interest

168. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 54; cf. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1053 (2016)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Article III does not give federal courts the power to order relief to
any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.”).
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in protecting the environment—call him Plaintiff 1—seeks injunctive
relief against a federal agency because the agency, in alleged violation
of federal environmental laws, has approved a development project
that would ruin an area of great natural beauty. If Plaintiff 1 has
nothing more at stake than his sincere and powerful concerns for
environmental preservation and governmental compliance with
environmental law, this suit lacks the “injury in fact” required for
Article III standing.170 Consider now a different plaintiff—call her
Plaintiff 2—who files a separate lawsuit over the same development
project, but this plaintiff actually uses the area in question and will no
longer be able to enjoy the unspoiled landscape if the allegedly illegal
project proceeds. Plaintiff 2 does have an Article III injury.171 Plaintiff
1’s case should be dismissed for want of standing, but Plaintiff 2’s case
may proceed, at least as far as “injury in fact” is concerned.
The next step is now obvious: Suppose that Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff
2 decide to sue together, joining their claims under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 20, which permits parties to join as plaintiffs when they
assert claims that arise from the same events and present common
questions of law or fact.172 They will assert identical claims and seek
identical injunctive relief. Can Plaintiff 1 invoke Article III jurisdiction
on the strength of Plaintiff 2’s standing? Under the one-plaintiff rule,
the answer is yes. The correct answer should instead be no, though
getting to that answer takes a bit of explanation.
We can begin with Rule 82, which provides that “[t]hese rules do
not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of
actions in those courts.”173 On one possible reading, Rule 82 means that
a claim over which the federal courts lack jurisdiction when filed by
itself cannot come within their jurisdiction just by being combined,

170. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 735–40 (1972).
171. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183
(2000); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986).
172. One might wonder whether the mere fact that multiple people are challenging the same
law provides a sufficient basis to support joinder under the terms of Rule 20, which requires not
just “[common] question[s] of law or fact”—a requirement that is satisfied due to the plaintiffs’
advancing the same legal challenge—but also that the plaintiffs’ claims “aris[e] out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). In
many public-law cases challenging the validity of a law, the only relevant events are the law’s
enactment and its application, in separate but similar events, to the different plaintiffs—or,
indeed, the expectation that the law would be (again, separately) applied to the plaintiffs in the
future.
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 82.
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through the Rules’ joinder provisions, with another claim that does
invoke jurisdiction. Rule 82’s usual application is to prevent expansion
of statutory jurisdiction, but, as the Supreme Court has stated, Rule 82
“applies a fortiori to any effort to extend by rule the judicial power of
the United States described in Article III of the Constitution.”174
One might think that Rule 82 straightforwardly outlaws the oneplaintiff rule, and indeed some litigants have made that argument, but
the matter is actually a bit more complicated than the simple
interpretation of the rule suggests. As the architects of the Federal
Rules explained, and as case law both before and after the
promulgation of the Rules showed, joinder rules can permissibly have
the indirect effect of expanding subject-matter jurisdiction by
increasing the size of the relevant litigation unit—that is, the case—to
which the preexisting jurisdictional rules are applied. In other words,
joinder rules may bring into a unitary federal case some claims and
parties that would not independently satisfy the requirements of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.175
The jurisdictional authority to entertain such additional claims
came, initially, from the judicially developed doctrines known as
ancillary, pendent, and pendent-parties jurisdiction. The basic idea of
these doctrines was that efficiency counselled, and the Constitution
permitted, the federal courts to exercise power over an entire
transactionally unified controversy, even if some claims or parties
bound up in it did not have their own jurisdictional basis.176 To take one
example, consider a Rule 14 impleader claim based on state law and

174. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992).
175. See Lesnik v. Pub. Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944) (acknowledging Rule 82
but stating that “jurisdiction is not extended by mere devices making possible more complete
adjudication of issues in a single case” and that “a mere broadening of the content of a single
federal action must not be confused with the extension of federal power”); 12 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 123, § 3141, at 555–58; Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on
Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 431–43 (1976). See generally Richard A. Matasar,
Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test
for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1399 (1983) (arguing that the constitutional
scope of supplemental jurisdiction is coextensive with the scope of lawfully adopted joinder rules).
176. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1966); see also George
B. Fraser, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Actions Involving Multiple Claims, 76 F.R.D. 525
(1978) (describing the scope of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction). For a summary of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Harry
Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45
YALE L.J. 393, 420 (1936).
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brought by a defendant against a nondiverse third party.177 That
impleader claim could not, standing on its own, satisfy the
requirements of federal-question or diversity jurisdiction because it
arises under state law and involves two nondiverse parties. Yet courts
would entertain such claims as a matter of ancillary jurisdiction.178
Though this was initially the result of judicially created doctrine, the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute now lends the practice express
statutory authority.179
In these types of cases, liberal joinder rules provide the
opportunity for the exercise of reserves of whole-case-encompassing
jurisdiction that might otherwise lie dormant. Such examples show that
the simple Rule 82 argument sketched above—if no jurisdiction as an
independent case, then no jurisdiction when joined—is a little too
simple and, in fact, does not align with longstanding practices.180
However, neither is it the case that proper joinder under the Rules
automatically means proper jurisdiction over all joined claims. Far
from it. The law of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction was complicated,
but in the context of multiple plaintiffs, the Supreme Court did not
allow plaintiffs whose claims fell short of the required jurisdictional
amount to obtain jurisdiction by joining with another plaintiff who had
an independently sufficient claim.181 Moreover, those cases involved
plaintiffs and claims that failed to satisfy only a statutory requirement

177. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a) (permitting a defending party to join a nonparty who may be liable
for all or part of the judgment against the defending party).
178. E.g., Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 716–17 (5th
Cir. 1970) (counterclaim by nondiverse third-party defendant); City of Boston v. Boston Edison
Co., 260 F.2d 872, 874 (1st Cir. 1958) (cross-claims between nondiverse co-defendants); Morrell
v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (impleader claim in which
defendant and one third-party defendant were not diverse).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
180. One might wonder what Rule 82 means if it does not mean that a claim that is
jurisdictionally deficient when filed alone cannot become sufficient through joinder. Perhaps the
correct meaning of Rule 82 is that the Rules do not and may not directly expand jurisdiction,
though they may do so incidentally through their properly procedural functions (promoting the
just and economical resolution of disputes, etc.). See Goldberg, supra note 175, at 441–43.
181. E.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (“Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be
dismissed from the case—‘one plaintiff may not ride in on another’s coattails.’” (quoting Zahn v.
Int’l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972))); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590
(1939) (“Proper practice requires that where each of several plaintiffs is bound to establish the
jurisdictional amount with respect to his own claim, the suit should be dismissed as to those who
fail to show that the requisite amount is involved.”); Hackner v. Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 117 F.2d
95, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1941).
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of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the principles of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction did not even allow an additional plaintiff to overcome the
statutory impediment of an insufficient amount in controversy, then it
is hard to fathom how an analogous theory of “pendent-plaintiff
standing” could provide a ticket into federal court for a plaintiff who
lacks constitutional standing altogether.
The supplemental-jurisdiction statute enacted in 1990 overrules
some of the prior case law that had limited jurisdiction over joined
plaintiffs, but it does not authorize the one-plaintiff rule either. The
statute extends statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over certain claims
that are transactionally related to a claim that has its own original basis
for subject-matter jurisdiction, and this expansion applies even when
the related claims are brought by a new plaintiff.182 As the Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute, a plaintiff asserting a claim with an
insufficient amount in controversy can now get into federal court by
joining, under Rule 20 or 23, with a plaintiff whose claim is sufficient.183
But it is well established that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute does
not confer Article III standing on new parties or claims.184
Indeed, the Supreme Court has told us that transactional
relatedness between claims cannot overcome a lack of standing. In
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,185 the plaintiffs challenged the legality
of both a municipal tax exemption and a state tax credit. The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a challenge to
the state tax credit, which was considered its own claim.186 The plaintiffs

182. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (authorizing jurisdiction over transactionally related claims
“includ[ing] claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties”).
183. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549, 566–67 (2005). The
statute does not override the complete diversity rule, which is only a requirement of statutory
jurisdiction. See id. at 553–54. Thus, the statute extends jurisdiction over an additional plaintiff
with an insufficient amount in controversy, but it still requires that this plaintiff (like all plaintiffs
in a diversity case) be diverse in citizenship from all defendants.
184. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 351–52 (2006) (rejecting the analogy
between supplemental statutory jurisdiction and standing); Turner v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that “Article III standing must be
established for each claim, including those over which there is supplemental jurisdiction”);
Montoya ex rel. S.M. v. Espanola Pub. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1310 (D.N.M.
2012) (stating that “[t]here is no case law which supports Plaintiff’s position” that a plaintiff need
not satisfy Article III standing requirements for supplemental claims under section 1367). It is not
clear to me that the defect in Montoya was actually an Article III defect rather than a failure on
the merits, but that is how the court understood it.
185. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
186. Id. at 346.
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nonetheless argued that their (assumed) standing to challenge the
municipal tax exemption gave them standing to challenge the state tax
credit on the theory that the two challenges derived from a common
nucleus of operative fact and thus composed a single “case” according
to the jurisdictional test of Gibbs.187 The Court rejected this notion of
“ancillary standing.”188
What we have never done is apply the rationale of Gibbs to permit
a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that
does not itself satisfy those elements of the Article III inquiry, such
as constitutional standing, that “serv[e] to identify those disputes
which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” We
see no reason to read the language of Gibbs so broadly, particularly
since our standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing for each claim he seeks to press.189

DaimlerChrysler’s rejection of supplemental standing came in the
context of a plaintiff with multiple, related claims. It did not
contemplate the addition of plaintiffs with no cognizable injury at all,
which, given the person-specific nature of judgments, is at least as
problematic.190
Further, excluding additional plaintiffs who lack standing is
desirable from the point of view of the relevant functional concerns.
Allowing federal jurisdiction to extend to claims that are
jurisdictionally defective on their own can sometimes promote the
rational, efficient adjudication of the whole dispute between all of the
affected parties.191 That laudable goal is generally promoted, the
Supreme Court tells us in Gibbs, when we allow the federal court to
hear together all of the claims that arise from the same nucleus of
operative fact.192 But the one-plaintiff rule does not promote optimal
packaging of the various claims and parties that together flesh out an
entire controversy, for it invites into the case parties who do not have

187. Id. at 350–51 (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)).
188. Id. at 353.
189. Id. at 351–52 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
190. Cf. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (“Our cases show . . . that with
respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not read
jurisdictional statutes broadly.”).
191. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1966).
192. See id.
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a redressable injury at all. The only commonality among the plaintiffs
is that they all challenge the same law or policy, but because the
additional plaintiffs need not have an actual injury, there is no logical
stopping point to how many might be added on a supplementalstanding theory. This leads to absurdities. If you were sensitive,
attentive, and litigious enough, then you, gentle reader, could be a
supplemental-standing plaintiff in hundreds of cases every year.
Provided just one plaintiff in each of your cases has standing, your own
standing need never be shown or found—and you could even win lots
of favorable judgments.
Based on the foregoing arguments, it appears that Congress lacks
the constitutional power to enact a “supplemental standing” statute
that would, like the judicially developed one-plaintiff rule, allow
multiple-plaintiff cases to be decided on the merits as to all parties as
long as one plaintiff has standing. The Supreme Court’s cases are full
of statements about the inflexible, legislatively unalterable nature of
Article III’s standing requirement. “It is settled that Congress cannot
erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”193
More broadly, the federal courts have only “judicial” power, which has
been understood to prohibit them from adjudicating the rights of mere
interested bystanders.194 A supplemental-standing statute would
license the federal courts to adjudicate not just the wrong kind of
case—such as a state-law claim between nondiverse parties—but to act
as something other than a federal court exercising the Article III
judicial power.195 The violation is all the worse if the overstepping is the
product of judicial design rather than legislative authorization, as the

193. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997); see also Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event . . . may Congress abrogate the Art. III
minima . . . .”).
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. As two commentators have stated in another context:
[T]here is a key conceptual difference between issue- or party-based limits on federal
subject matter jurisdiction and the case-or-controversy requirement that renders a
violation of the latter considerably more troubling: when a court violates the case-orcontroversy requirement, it ceases to act like a court. This is not so when a court violates
an issue- or party-based limit.
Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed Solution to the
Serious (but Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1388 (2014);
cf. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that “an Article III case or
controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an Article
III case or controversy”).
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one-plaintiff rule is, for then it is usurpation as well.
In any event, even if the language of Article III is open-textured
enough to give Congress the power to enact a supplemental-standing
statute, Congress has not done so. Section 1367 certainly is not such a
statute, for the reasons already explained.196 And the familiar doctrine
of avoiding interpretations of statutes that raise doubtful questions
about congressional authority197 would require that Congress speak
clearly before the courts find that it has attempted to achieve such a
result. For similar reasons, the Rules Enabling Act should not be read
to license procedural rules that confer standing on additional parties,
even if that were constitutionally possible.198
3. Judicial Economy Cannot Justify Skipping over Standing. The
one-plaintiff rule is justified largely on grounds of judicial economy: if
a court is going to resolve the merits anyway due to the presence of one
plaintiff with standing, resolving difficult standing issues for coplaintiffs is a waste of effort. The economy gains are themselves
overstated, as will be explained shortly.199 But even if the one-plaintiff
rule serves judicial economy, that benefit cannot justify skipping over
standing.
Probably the best illustration of the limited role of economy-based
arguments in this context comes from Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

196. See supra notes 182–92 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”).
198. The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the courts to promulgate “rules of practice and
procedure” and mandates that the rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). The Act’s relationship to jurisdiction is a bit obscure. Compare
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (“There are other limitations upon the authority
to prescribe rules which might have been, but were not mentioned in the Act; for instance, the
inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute.”), and
Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 94 (1998) (stating that “‘[s]ubstantive rights,’ as the term is used in the
Act, includes matters, such as subject matter jurisdiction, as to which rulemaking authority could
not constitutionally be delegated to the Court”), with Goldberg, supra note 175, at 433–41
(arguing that subject-matter jurisdiction is “procedural” for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act
but that the rules are not permitted to define Article III boundaries, as opposed to
subconstitutional jurisdictional limits), and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2012) (authorizing courts to
promulgate rules permitting interlocutory appeals).
199. See infra Part III.B.
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Environment.200 In Steel Co., the Supreme Court disapproved the
concept of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” according to which a federal
court could “proceed immediately to the merits [of the case], despite
jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) the merits question is more
readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be
the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied.”201 The Court
rejected hypothetical jurisdiction because a court without authority
cannot determine the merits, even if only to determine the merits
against a plaintiff who may upon careful inquiry have also failed on
jurisdictional grounds.202 The jurisdictional question in Steel Co. itself
was one of Article III standing.203 The Court was accordingly required
to address standing as a threshold matter and, upon doing so, found
that the plaintiff lacked standing. The Court therefore did not reach
the merits.204
The one-plaintiff rule might be considered a form of partial
hypothetical jurisdiction: although jurisdiction in the form of Article
III standing is not assumed for the whole case, it is still assumed as to
some parties. To that extent, using the one-plaintiff rule is, as Steel Co.
puts it, “by very definition . . . to act ultra vires.”205
The argument against the one-plaintiff rule based on Steel Co. is
subject to two potential responses. One is more promising than the
other, but neither ultimately succeeds in vindicating the one-plaintiff
rule.
First, there are some exceptions to Steel Co.’s rule against
pretermitting questions of standing. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence,
joined by Justice Kennedy, was necessary to make a majority for the
relevant portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion of the Court, and Justice
O’Connor was willing to allow that future cases could present
appropriate occasions for deviating from a strict jurisdiction-first
approach.206 And, indeed, in subsequent cases the Court did allow

200. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
201. Id. at 94, 93.
202. Id. at 94–95.
203. Id. at 102.
204. Id. at 102, 109–10.
205. Id. at 102.
206. See id. at 110–11 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I write separately to note that, in my view,
the Court’s opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under
which federal courts may exercise judgment in ‘reserv[ing] difficult questions of . . . jurisdiction
when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976)); see also Jack H.
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various kinds of jurisdictional questions to be skipped over in favor of
various kinds of nonjurisdictional-yet-threshold inquiries. For
example, the Court has allowed determinations of jurisdiction to be
pretermitted in favor of dismissals on grounds of forum non
conveniens,207 and it has ruled that class certification can be denied
when certification presents questions “logically antecedent” to
questions of Article III standing.208 The Court also allowed a question
of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, which is a type of
jurisdictional question, to be pretermitted in order to rule that the
statute giving rise to the claim at issue did not even encompass the state
as a defendant.209
Steel Co. may be permeable, but the one-plaintiff rule cannot fit
within the letter or the logic of the exceptions described above. The
one-plaintiff rule involves skipping a question of Article III
jurisdiction—the most fundamental limit on federal judicial power—in
order to resolve a plaintiff’s claim on ordinary merits grounds. No
Supreme Court case elaborating on or limiting Steel Co. has licensed
that. Rather, the cases that qualify Steel Co. give courts discretion to
choose among threshold nonmerits grounds.210 Notably, even the case
that bypassed state sovereign immunity in order to decide a question
of statutory coverage still decided a question of Article III standing
before reaching any other ground for decision.211 Further, in cases
involving the one-plaintiff rule, the resolution of the merits question is
generally not logically antecedent to the standing inquiry, a feature that
has sometimes justified resolving a nonjurisdictional ground first.212
Finally, it bears remembering that all of these hypothetical-jurisdiction
cases involve decisions against plaintiffs. Some cases under the oneplaintiff rule go on to rule against the supplemental plaintiff(s) on the
merits, but others rule in favor of the supplemental plaintiff(s), a result
the hypothetical-jurisdiction cases would not have dreamed of.

Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 265–66 (2000) (describing
the uncertainty over the scope of the Steel Co. holding caused by the multiple conflicting opinions
in the case).
207. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007). This case
involved questions of personal jurisdiction and statutory subject-matter jurisdiction, though not
Article III jurisdiction.
208. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999).
209. Vt. Nat. Res. Agency v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2000).
210. See Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 430–31.
211. Vt. Nat. Res. Agency, 529 U.S. at 771.
212. Id. at 779; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831.
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A second argument against the decisiveness of Steel Co. contends
that the one-plaintiff rule does not compromise the principles
underlying standing doctrine in the same way that hypothetical
jurisdiction does. In Steel Co. and most other hypothetical-jurisdiction
cases, an assumption in favor of jurisdiction would allow the court to
address a merits question that would not otherwise be addressed. In
the cases at issue here, in contrast, the merits are going to be reached
regardless, because at least one plaintiff has standing. The one-plaintiff
rule therefore does not lead to a court resolving a question it otherwise
would not resolve. In this way, the rule arguably does not entail a
judicial usurpation of authority or otherwise offend the restraintoriented justifications for standing doctrine.213 Moreover, the presence
of at least one plaintiff with a genuine stake in the controversy—as
shown by having a redressable injury caused by the defendant—helps
to ensure that the case will be vigorously contested, which serves
another goal of standing doctrine.214 In this respect, the one-plaintiff
rule is arguably less problematic than the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction condemned in Steel Co.
This argument is more promising than the first one, but it is still
not ultimately persuasive. The rule against hypothetical standing is not
a rule about the generalized interest in restraining courts from reaching
certain merits issues. It is a rule about judicial power to issue judgments
on the merits.215 And judgments, unlike precedents, apply to specific
persons.216 In Vermont Natural Resources Agency v. United States ex rel.
Stevens,217 the Court justified its decision to pretermit Eleventh
Amendment immunity based partly on the fact that doing so would not
“permit the court to pronounce upon any issue, or upon the rights of
any person, beyond the issues and persons that would be reached”

213. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 729–30; cf. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,
353 (2006) (condemning the plaintiffs’ “ancillary standing” theory and observing that it would
lead to “federal courts thus deciding issues they would not otherwise be authorized to decide”
(emphasis added)).
214. The relationship between vigorous contestation and constitutional injury is tenuous and
unreliable, but standing doctrine does traditionally posit such a connection. See Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (observing that standing doctrine tries to “assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369, U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
215. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998).
216. See supra notes 118–20, 164–65 and accompanying text.
217. Vt. Nat. Res. Agency v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2006).
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otherwise.218 The one-plaintiff rule, in contrast, allows courts to
adjudicate the rights of persons outside of their power. In sum, the
hypothetical-jurisdiction line of cases shows that judicial economy
cannot authorize the one-plaintiff rule’s pretermission of standing.
B. Rebutting the Efficiency-Based Case for the One-Plaintiff Rule
The argument in favor of the one-plaintiff rule mostly relies on a
pragmatic concern for judicial economy.219 Once a court determines
that one plaintiff has standing, the court must proceed to the merits
regardless of other plaintiffs’ standing, and so—the argument goes—
the other plaintiffs’ standing is then immaterial. And because deciding
whether the other plaintiffs have standing would require some extra
effort, particularly where those other plaintiffs’ standing is a close call,
courts may properly dispense with a plaintiff-by-plaintiff analysis.
Beyond judicial convenience, a further reason to avoid ruling on
standing comes from the general policy of avoiding unnecessary
constitutional decisions.220
The previous Section explained why the relevant legal principles
and precedents require that all plaintiffs have standing. This Section
explains why the efficiency-based argument for the one-plaintiff rule
fails even on its own terms.
1. The One-Plaintiff Rule Is Not as Efficient as It Seems. The first
problem with the judicial-economy-based argument for the oneplaintiff rule is that it starts from an incorrect premise, namely that the
standing of other plaintiffs is immaterial once one proper plaintiff has
been found. If in fact the standing of other plaintiffs mattered, though,
then one could not so easily ignore it in the name of judicial
convenience. And it does matter. That the standing of the other
plaintiffs is important is especially clear when the plaintiffs end up
winning on the merits. As discussed above, there are genuine benefits

218. Id. at 779 (emphasis added).
219. See Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 Fed. App’x 795, 802 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing
“judicial efficiency”); Steinman, supra note 15, at 729.
220. See Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as support for the one-plaintiff rule); 13B WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 53, § 3531.15, at 337 (stating that “[t]he temptation to make unnecessary rulings
as to the standing of surplus plaintiffs should be resisted”); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (providing a classic statement of the
avoidance policy).
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that come along with winning a judgment as opposed to merely winning
favorable precedent.221 The benefits are most obvious when matters
like attorneys’ fees and costs are at issue, though as we have seen,
courts are often, though not always, careful to conduct plaintiff-byplaintiff analyses when awarding such relief. But even apart from that,
it matters whether one is a judgment holder or instead merely a
nonparty who likes the outcome. For example, a prevailing plaintiff’s
claims merge into the judgment as a matter of claim preclusion, the
issues resolved in the plaintiff’s favor support issue preclusion in later
litigation, a winning plaintiff can later enforce the judgment, and so on.
When the plaintiffs whose standing is questionable are going to
lose on the merits, the pragmatic argument for pretermitting standing
has more appeal, though even here the gains are often illusory. True, it
would be desirable to avoid the judicial effort required to say exactly
why a plaintiff loses.222 That is a sure benefit of using the one-plaintiff
rule. Still, even in this scenario, it is not irrelevant how a plaintiff loses.
Different consequences attach to jurisdictional losses versus merits
losses, such as different preclusive effects in later litigation.223
Because of the different consequences of merits losses versus
jurisdictional losses, the one-plaintiff rule saves some time in one case
only to introduce the risk of inconvenience and uncertainty later. As a
general rule, dismissals on the merits are preclusive of later litigation
on the same claims or issues, but dismissals for want of standing do not
preclude later litigation of the merits if the lack of standing can be
overcome.224 When a plaintiff’s standing is bypassed under the oneplaintiff rule, it may be unclear what preclusive effect to give the merits
ruling as to that plaintiff.225 On the one hand, if the merits of the claims

221. See supra Part II.A.
222. As Justice Breyer asked in the context of hypothetical jurisdiction, “Whom does it help
to have appellate judges spend their time and energy puzzling over the correct answer to an
intractable jurisdictional matter, when (assuming an easy answer on the substantive merits) the
same party would win or lose regardless?” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
111 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
223. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
225. Sorting out preclusive effects was a problem under the old doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court has now largely disapproved but which still exists in some
forms. For commentary taking different views on the matter, see, e.g., Joshua S. Stillman,
Hypothetical Statutory Jurisdiction and the Limits of Federal Judicial Power, 68 ALA. L. REV. 493,
541–44 (2016); Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1147–49
(2013); Ely Todd Chayet, Note, Hypothetical Jurisdiction and Interjurisdictional Preclusion: A
“Comity” of Errors, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 96–101 (2000); Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction
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and issues resolved in the first case are open to reexamination in a later
suit, or if uncertainty over the judgment’s preclusive effects merely
breeds later litigation, then we have undermined the efficiency
rationale for pretermitting standing in the first place. On the other
hand, to treat the first court’s determination of the merits as fully
binding would be jarring given the doubt about the first court’s
constitutional authority, a doubt that the court itself acknowledged yet
intentionally disregarded.226 To be sure, it does not sit well to see a
former plaintiff, who after all was the one invoking the federal court’s
power, later deny the existence of that power when the merits turn out
badly—and yet in some other circumstances we allow plaintiffs to
launch belated attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction despite the odor
of opportunism.227 Whichever approach we take, these are not good
options. There are costs that come with choosing the path of immediate
expediency represented by the one-plaintiff rule.
2. Requiring All Plaintiffs To Have Standing Does Not Lead to
Impracticalities or Bad Consequences. The case in favor of the oneplaintiff rule relies primarily on considerations of judicial economy.
But requiring a standing inquiry for all plaintiffs is not so bad from the
point of view of practicalities. It even has some practical virtues.
First, deciding whether all plaintiffs have standing often would not
require much additional judicial effort. When the plaintiffs in a case
are similarly situated—for example, multiple users of a recreational
area threatened with environmental harm—the standing inquiries will
all be parallel, and so a court can handle them en bloc.228
Second, even when some plaintiffs present distinctive and difficult
standing questions, a court will not always have to resolve them.
Although courts may not ignore standing, courts have enough

Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 754
n.110 (1979); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking:
Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 308–32
(2011) (emphasizing the important link between jurisdictional sequencing and preclusion).
226. If a case is litigated on the merits without any doubts about subject-matter jurisdiction
being raised, the judgment can later withstand a collateral attack despite the undiscovered defect.
See Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 12, 69 (1982). Our situation is different in that the potential defect
was considered in the first case but then consciously disregarded.
227. E.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804).
228. E.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008); FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). In each of the multiple-plaintiff cases
just cited, the Court conducted a single standing inquiry that applied equally to each plaintiff.
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flexibility in managing dockets and sequencing decisions to help some
standing questions disappear. Once a court finds standing for the most
obviously injured plaintiff(s), or hints that such a ruling is likely, the
defendant might agree to settle the case or the other plaintiffs might
voluntarily dismiss themselves with the expectation that they will
practically benefit from a victory by the remaining plaintiff. (The
mechanics of how courts should rule on standing, and how much
flexibility they have in determining exactly when to do so, are
described in more detail below.229)
Third, once the need for all plaintiffs to have standing becomes
well established in the case law, some parties with questionable
standing may no longer try to ride along as additional plaintiffs in a suit
that has a clearly injured plaintiff. The burden of pleading and, if
necessary, factually establishing standing is on the plaintiffs, not the
court, and so supernumerary plaintiffs whose standing is questionable
may have to face the costs of collecting affidavits, eating up pages of
their briefs, and other efforts to establish their standing.230 When
another plaintiff has standing and will secure relief that will practically
benefit other potential plaintiffs, the cost may not be worth it.
Fourth, rejecting the one-plaintiff rule would not deprive the
public of judicial decisions on the merits of important questions. To be
sure, the courts find it acceptable for there to be important disputes in
which nobody can invoke judicial review.231 Yet even if one favored
universal judicial review, the point of the one-plaintiff rule is that there
already is another person who has standing to litigate the merits of the
dispute, right there in the form of a co-plaintiff in the case at bar. So
the same issues can be resolved regardless.
Fifth, rejecting the one-plaintiff rule probably would not damage
the quality of the litigation process. One might have that worry in the
situation in which the would-be plaintiff without standing is a wellequipped interest group while the plaintiff with standing is a concretely
injured, but unsophisticated, individual. Of course, it is a general
feature (or perhaps rather a bug) of standing doctrine, even in singleplaintiff litigation, that it might select as a “proper” litigant someone

229. See infra Part III.E.
230. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188–89 (1936).
231. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The
assumption that if [these plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a
reason to find standing.”).
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who does not appear likely to present the case in the strongest way.232
As in other cases, there are ways to compensate for weak plaintiffs: the
sophisticated party can file briefs as amicus curiae, provide pro bono
representation to the injured-but-under-resourced party, and so on.
Sixth, and as already noted, although the one-plaintiff rule may
save a court from making a difficult standing decision in the case at
hand, it does so at the cost of depriving the legal system of precedent.233
Precedent on hard questions has value for the public and other courts.
C. “Sort It Out Later” Is Not a Solution
One potential response to the arguments above is to acknowledge
that there is something problematic with giving benefits to plaintiffs
who lack standing but, in response, to embrace a seemingly pragmatic
compromise according to which standingless plaintiffs only need to be
weeded out if and when it really “matters.” For example, if a plaintiff
whose standing was initially pretermitted later tries to introduce
distinct legal claims or enforce a judgment or obtain attorneys’ fees or
take whatever actions a court believes would exceed the scope of the
party’s supplemental standing, at that point the question of standing can
be resolved and the plaintiff’s request granted or denied accordingly.
This approach has some appeal, and it is probably what some
courts applying the one-plaintiff rule assume will happen, but it will not
work. As a doctrinal matter, standing is described as a threshold
inquiry that must be satisfied to pursue relief, not just to get it.234 And
during this meantime when it supposedly “doesn’t matter” whether a
plaintiff has standing, the court is still exercising power on behalf of
and against a plaintiff whose standing is openly in doubt. These
activities might include granting preliminary relief, entering meritsrelated discovery orders, dismissing a claim on the merits, allowing the
party to put on evidence and cross-examine witnesses at trial, or
granting a final judgment entitling all plaintiffs to injunctive relief. If
the proponent of the pragmatic compromise concedes that at least
some such exercises of power “matter,” as Supreme Court precedent
suggests they do,235 then one cannot defer standing decisions for long.

232. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738–41 (1972) (denying standing to the Sierra
Club because of lack of allegations of particularized harm to a member).
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
235. Cf. U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76–77
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And so the compromise position unravels.
Further, the pragmatic delaying tactic is not always so pragmatic
when one thinks it through. To the extent that some standing inquiries
are put off until a request for attorneys’ fees (which are common in
cases against governmental defendants), the enforcement of the
judgment, or another decision point, the effort involved in making a
decision is merely shifted around. And, as noted already, leaving a
plaintiff’s standing unresolved sows uncertainty that may crop up in
subsequent litigation about the effects of the prior litigation.236 In sum,
for both formal and functional reasons, sorting out standing at some
indefinite future date is not a satisfactory response. The proper way for
a district court to address standing—a way that respects Article III
while also allowing some room for consideration of judicial economy—
is described below.237
D. Does Stare Decisis Save the One-Plaintiff Rule?
If the foregoing arguments are correct, the one-plaintiff rule never
should have gotten off the ground. Even so, by this point more than
two dozen Supreme Court cases, plus many more cases in the lower
courts, have applied the one-plaintiff rule in one form or another.
Although the Supreme Court has sometimes implicitly departed from
the rule by conducting standing inquiries that the rule would deem
unnecessary,238 the Court has never directly rejected the rule.239 The
rule can therefore claim some authority, regardless of its correctness,
simply as a matter of stare decisis. Accordingly, the proponent of

(1988) (holding that nonparty witness may raise the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in
defense of a civil contempt citation for failure to respond to discovery requests, despite the
absence of a final judgment in the underlying action).
236. See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
237. See infra Part III.E.
238. See supra note 19.
239. Some litigants and lower courts have cited a passage from Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984), as a rejection of the one-plaintiff rule: “Typically, however, the standing inquiry requires
careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular
plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Id. at 752 (emphasis
added); see supra note 47 (citing cases that rely on this passage). This reliance is ill placed. Allen
did not involve any sort of supplemental-standing scenario. It did involve multiple plaintiffs,
indeed a nationwide class action. Allen, 468 U.S. at 743. But it was not a case in which different
plaintiffs were differently situated such that the Court undertook different standing inquires for
different parties. Rather, the plaintiffs were found to lack standing, as a group, for reasons that
applied in common to all. To use this language to undermine the one-plaintiff rule is to take it out
of context.
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change must present something more than an argument that the oneplaintiff rule is wrong. That “something more” comes from three
further considerations: lack of reliance on the one-plaintiff rule, the
rule’s tension with other lines of precedent, and the rule’s unreasoned
genesis and repetition.
1. No Reliance Interests. A crucial factor in deciding whether to
overrule precedent is whether there has been reliance on the prior law
such that overruling it would unfairly frustrate expectations.240
Reliance interests are generally slight when it comes to matters of
judicial procedure as compared, for example, to property rights or
other substantive entitlements.241 That generalization holds true here.
It is hard to imagine that the ill-defined generic category composed of
parties who lack a constitutionally cognizable harm could have ordered
their affairs around their ability to be a party when they join as coplaintiffs with parties who do have standing. The possibility of reliance
further erodes given that the one-plaintiff rule is not mandatory; courts
may choose to bypass standing of additional plaintiffs, but they are also
permitted to analyze the standing of every plaintiff and dismiss those
without standing.242 Some standingless plaintiffs, though not all, have
gotten lucky in the past, but there is no right to good luck.
2. Out of Step with Other Developments. If a doctrine is out of step
with other lines of precedent, that inconsistency both tends to show
that the outlier doctrine is wrong and, more importantly here, militates
in favor of jettisoning it so as to increase the overall coherence of the
corpus juris.243 Admittedly, one might say that coherence-oriented
arguments are not particularly compelling in the standing context,
given that the whole doctrine is a bit wanting in coherence. Still,
consistency is a virtue the law should strive to embody. Developments
since the one-plaintiff rule’s advent make it an increasingly anomalous

240. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). See generally
Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459 (2013) (examining the role of
reliance arguments in the doctrine of stare decisis); Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to
Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035 (2013) (same).
241. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are
involved; the opposite is true in cases . . . involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” (citations
omitted)).
242. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
243. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388–93, 403–05 (1970).

BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ONE GOOD PLAINTIFF

12/5/2017 11:16 AM

537

outlier.244
First, the Supreme Court has become increasingly granular in its
standing inquiries in single-plaintiff scenarios. The law is now clear that
a single plaintiff must satisfy standing requirements for every claim that
the plaintiff asserts. The Supreme Court’s most extensive discussion
came in DaimlerChrysler. The plaintiffs in that case challenged the
legality of both a municipal tax exemption and a state tax credit. The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
state tax credit.245 In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that their
assumed standing to challenge the municipal tax exemption gave them
a form of supplemental standing to bring their related challenge to the
state tax credit, the Court turned them away. “[O]ur standing cases
confirm,” the Court ruled, “that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing
for each claim he seeks to press.”246 No Justice dissented.247
Indeed, the Court has gone beyond even claim-specific standing,
requiring as well that a plaintiff demonstrate standing as to each form
of relief sought. Illustrative in this regard is City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons,248 in which the Court held that a motorist who had been choked
by the police could seek damages for his past injury but, in light of the
absence of a real threat of recurrence, lacked standing to seek
injunctive relief to prevent future harm.249
Second, the one-plaintiff rule was developed before Steel Co.’s
rejection of hypothetical jurisdiction, the practice whereby a court

244. Depending on its future membership, the Court could shift toward more lenient standing
rules in certain respects. For example, in cases involving plaintiffs with somewhat speculative
injuries, or in cases in which Congress has given individual consumers the right to enforce
technical regulatory requirements through provisions for statutory damages, the Court may come
out differently in the future than it has in the recent past. But any reasonably foreseeable Supreme
Court is unlikely to abandon its largely formalistic approach (honored sometimes in the breach,
to be sure) about the mandatory, jurisdictional nature of Article III standing. The one-plaintiff
rule is therefore likely to remain anomalous even if the Court’s doctrine shifts a bit this way or
that.
245. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006).
246. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
247. Justice Ginsburg filed a separate concurrence to express disagreement with some of the
limitations on standing that the Court has developed since the 1970s, but she did not object to the
every-claim rule in particular. Id. at 354–55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
248. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
249. Id. at 105, 109. I am uncomfortable with this aspect of the Court’s current approach to
standing. But discomfort with Lyons’s remedy-specific approach to standing is perfectly
compatible with rejection of the one-plaintiff rule, which gives judgments to persons without
standing to seek any relief whatsoever.
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could pretermit discussion of standing in order to dismiss a case on the
merits.250 As discussed already,251 the one-plaintiff rule conflicts with
Steel Co.’s proposition that assuming jurisdiction to adjudicate the
merits is ultra vires for an Article III court, and it also clashes with Steel
Co.’s broader reluctance to bypass jurisdictional hurdles in the name
of judicial economy.
There is at least one aspect of current standing law that does fit
comfortably with the one-plaintiff rule, and that is the doctrine of
associational standing. According to this doctrine, an organization has
standing to sue if at least one of its members would have standing as an
individual, the interests at stake are related to the association’s
purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the requested relief
requires the individual members’ participation.252 Associational
standing has a superficial resemblance to supplemental-plaintiff
standing in that one entity’s standing is sufficient to confer standing on
another, but the theory behind the two doctrines is quite different.
Associational standing is a form of representational standing in which
the association stands in the shoes of its affected members.253 In the
usual multiple-plaintiff case in which the one-plaintiff rule is applied,
the parties who obtain the benefit of the rule do not stand in any such
representational relationship; they merely have the same legal claim as
the other plaintiffs.254 The doctrine of associational standing therefore
stands even if the one-plaintiff rule falls.255

250. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–95 (1998).
251. See supra Part III.A.3.
252. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). This form of
standing is typically employed in cases seeking declaratory or injunctive relief; the joinder of the
affected members as parties is often necessary when the complaint seeks damages for the
members. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515–16 (1975) (requiring joinder of members
for damages claims), with United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp.,
Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (allowing organization to seek damages for members). This form of
associational standing should be distinguished from the related doctrine according to which an
organization has standing to seek redress for its own injuries suffered as an organization. See, e.g.,
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
253. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751, 517 U.S. at 555, 557.
254. Cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 896–98 (2008) (distinguishing, in the preclusion
context, between representative relationships and mere shared interests).
255. Alternatively, one could challenge the correctness of associational standing as well, such
as because it has the effect of circumventing Rule 23 or other legal requirements for establishing
representational relationships. Eliminating associational standing would not be very disruptive
because of the availability of suits brought by affected members (who could be represented by
the organization as counsel) and class actions. The Supreme Court, however, has not shown an
interest in revisiting the basic soundness of associational standing. See Int’l Union v. Brock, 477
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The one-plaintiff rule, is, in short, “a derelict in the stream of the
law.”256 The overall coherence of the Supreme Court’s standing
doctrine would be improved were it overruled.257
3. Ill-Considered and Unexplained. Suppose a court exercises
jurisdiction over a case without any discussion of the propriety of doing
so. According to the Supreme Court, unexamined assumptions of
jurisdiction do not establish precedent that controls a later case in
which the jurisdictional question is actually put into controversy.258
That is not exactly the situation we confront in the cases applying
the one-plaintiff rule, but one could make a similar argument
oppugning the precedential value of those cases. Although the cases
repeating the rule do not simply assume jurisdiction sub silentio, they
do state it only in passing, without reflection, often in a footnote and
rarely spending more than one sentence on it.259 Further, the rule
originally developed in a rather casual way, without adverse briefing
from the parties or, so far as one can tell, careful judicial deliberation.
The Supreme Court has never provided a justification for the oneplaintiff rule, whether to explain how it is consistent with standing
doctrine or why the rule is valuable enough to allow a departure from

U.S. 274, 288–90 (1986).
256. N.D. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973).
257. Zimmerman uses the Court’s practice in severability analysis to undermine the Court’s
generally claim-specific approach to standing and, along the way, briefly discusses the oneplaintiff rule as another doctrine that is in tension with the claim-specific approach. Zimmerman,
supra note 155, at 337–38. I agree with him that there is tension between the multiple-claim cases
(like DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno), which expressly reject a form of supplemental standing, and the
multiple-plaintiff cases, which allow uninjured plaintiffs to tag along. But we differ on how to
resolve the tension. It is the multiple-plaintiff cases that are out of step, from a coherentist
perspective, with the larger pattern of particular doctrines and underlying principles of standing.
(I believe that severability, which is his main focus, presents rather different issues that are not
best understood as shedding light on standing one way or the other.) Coherence therefore
supports eliminating the one-plaintiff anomaly. Again, I myself have some doubts about aspects
of the Court’s standing doctrine, but whatever one thinks standing requires, all plaintiffs require
it.
258. E.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144–45 (2011); see also Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (denying the precedential value of “driveby jurisdictional rulings”).
259. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432 n.19 (1998) (“Because both the City
of New York and the health care [plaintiffs-]appellees have standing, we need not consider
whether the [plaintiff-]appellee unions also have standing to sue.”); Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977) (“Because of the presence of this plaintiff,
we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to
maintain the suit.”).
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ordinary principles of standing. The closest the Court has come was
this passage in Doe v. Bolton, one of the first Supreme Court decisions
to announce the one-plaintiff rule:
We conclude that we need not pass upon the status of these additional
appellants in this suit, for the issues are sufficiently and adequately
presented by Doe and the physician-appellants, and nothing is gained
or lost by the presence or absence of the nurses, the clergymen, the
social workers, and the corporations.260

The implicit theory here appears to be that a finding of standing makes
no difference (“nothing is gained or lost”) and so the analysis can be
skipped, presumably as a matter of judicial convenience. The Court
neglects to consider either the practical consequences of party status or
the formal validity of dispensing with a ruling on constitutional
jurisdiction.
The Court’s attention in the early cases applying the one-plaintiff
rule was, somewhat understandably, focused elsewhere than on
standing doctrine. None of the early cases were cases in which the
Court addressed only standing; standing was discussed on the way to a
holding on the merits. And those decisions on the merits were
significant, sometimes momentous, such that the Court’s attention was
surely directed toward substance rather than standing. Several of the
early cases were abortion cases, and one of the others was the campaign
finance landmark Buckley v. Valeo,261 which was decided under
unusually rushed circumstances.262
In sum, the Supreme Court’s creation and propagation of the oneplaintiff rule has not been particularly thoughtful or deliberate. As
such, the rule should not enjoy the respect the Court ordinarily accords
its precedents.
E. What Courts Should Do in Multiple-Plaintiff Cases with Doubtful

260. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973). This passage is followed by a citation to Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but that case did not apply the one-plaintiff rule. Rather, the Court
found that plaintiff Roe had standing and then went on to rule that the Does, a married couple
who also sued, lacked standing. Id. at 127–29.
261. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
262. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION
L.J. 241, 242 (2003) (describing the “rushed drafting by committee” that characterized the
Buckley opinion).
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Standing
Let us suppose that the Supreme Court sees the light and
repudiates or seriously limits the one-plaintiff rule. How, in that new
regime, should courts assess standing in multiple-plaintiff cases? The
basic rule is simple: courts need to assess the standing of all plaintiffs
rather than effectively assuming the standing of every plaintiff upon
finding that one plaintiff has standing. To be clear, a court should not
dismiss a case in its entirety if it finds that some but not all plaintiffs
lack standing. Just as one plaintiff’s standing should not transfer to
another plaintiff, neither should one plaintiff’s lack of standing
undermine the standing of another plaintiff and bar an injured party
from the courts. What should happen is that the court should proceed
to the merits only with regard to the proper plaintiff(s), dismissing the
other(s).
The approach just stated is simple enough, but its proper
implementation varies according to the circumstances. In particular,
the rule works a bit differently in different courts, so we should
separately consider the mechanics in the district courts, courts of
appeals, and Supreme Court.
1. The Supreme Court. For the Supreme Court, it should be simple
to do the right thing. The discretionary character of the Court’s docket
provides ample opportunities to honor the requirements of Article III
standing without causing the Court inconvenience.
To begin with, the Court can reduce the need for the one-plaintiff
rule through its choices at the certiorari stage. Questions that are worth
a place on the Court’s docket rarely appear in only one case. When
deciding whether a particular multiple-plaintiff case presents the best
vehicle for reviewing a particular legal question, the Court could
consider whether the standing of all plaintiffs is secure.
Once the Court has granted certiorari, it has several options. Most
obviously, it could consider the standing of all parties and dismiss those
found to lack standing, as it sometimes does already.263 One virtue of
this approach is that it would provide litigants and lower courts
additional guidance on close matters of standing. (Of course, the Court
may not want to provide such guidance, either because it wishes to
preserve its own future flexibility or because it does not regard the time

263. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (citing examples of the Court doing this).
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as well spent.)
But the Court need not undertake a per-plaintiff inquiry if that
would be inconvenient. If the Court determines that one party has
standing, the Court could decide the merits as to that party and could
remand for further consideration of the other plaintiffs’ standing—an
approach that would be especially appealing if the Court is going to
remand for other reasons anyway. The proceedings on remand might
not actually occur: if the Court reaches the merits as to any party and
creates nationwide precedent, issues involving other plaintiffs would
typically be settled without further judicial involvement. That would
almost certainly be true when the case involves injunctive relief against
a government defendant.
Finally, the Court could dismiss certiorari as improvidently
granted (DIG) as to the troublesome plaintiffs. A dismissal does not
amount to an adjudication even of standing, let alone of the merits, but
simply leaves the dismissed matter as it was had certiorari never been
granted.264 That would mean leaving in place a decision the correctness
of which the Court is not certain, but of course the Court does that all
the time by denying certiorari outright in the vast majority of cases that
are brought to its attention.
2. Courts of Appeals. As before, the basic rule is that the court
may not decide the merits as to a particular party when that party’s
standing remains unresolved. One obvious disposition, which courts
sometimes use already, is to decide the standing of all plaintiffs, order
the dismissal of those who lack it, and decide the merits as to those who
have it.265 Yet other options are available too, for courts have some
flexibility regarding when and how a question of standing is taken up.266
Especially when a fact-intensive issue of standing is raised for the first

264. See generally Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An
Empirical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1421 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
DIG practice). Although a DIG usually dismisses the whole case, the Court can DIG part of a
case but not all of it. See id. at 1434. A different procedural route to a similar outcome is illustrated
by Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999). The Court had
before it two appeals from different lower courts that had been consolidated for oral argument.
After resolving the merits of one of the cases, the court dismissed the other appeal because that
case “no longer present[ed] a substantial federal question.” Id. at 344. That second appeal
involved serious questions as to standing, as the plaintiff was the House of Representatives.
265. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 19, 45.
266. See generally Justin Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2012)
(discussing various ways that courts deal with jurisdictional questions that arise on appeal).

BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ONE GOOD PLAINTIFF

12/5/2017 11:16 AM

543

time on appeal, the appellate court might remand the question of the
standing of one or more plaintiffs to the district court for that court to
consider standing in the first instance.267 There is no apparent barrier
to a mixed disposition in which a court of appeals decides the merits as
to a party it finds to have standing and remands for further
investigation into the standing of others. In many such cases, no further
proceedings would take place, as the parties would voluntarily resolve
the case in light of the merits ruling occasioned by the proper plaintiff’s
claim. Thus can some of the efficiency benefits of the one-plaintiff rule
often be had, and without violating Article III.
3. District Courts. For every plaintiff as to whom the opposing
party has raised a genuine question regarding standing, or as to whom
standing looks questionable to the court even without any objection
from the opposing party, the court must look into the issue and decide
whether standing is proper. In other words, the court should be as
vigilant about standing in multiple-plaintiff cases as it would be in a
single-plaintiff case.268
The duty to resolve a question of standing does not mean that a
district court must decide on the standing of all parties the moment a
question about standing appears. In single-plaintiff cases, although
standing is a threshold issue that the court must not ignore, a district
court need not follow a rigid timetable for deciding standing. If a court
is unable to resolve a standing question when it initially presents itself,
the court may order discovery or additional briefing on the matter.269
A district court might rule that one party has standing but rule that the

267. One might wonder whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to order a remand when
standing, and thus its own jurisdiction, is questionable. A court has jurisdiction to determine its
jurisdiction. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002). Likewise, it has at least enough
jurisdiction to remand to the district court for that court to determine its jurisdiction. E.g., Belleri
v. United States, 712 F.3d 543, 549 (11th Cir. 2013); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp., 263 F. App’x 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2008).
268. As in a single-plaintiff case, the court can in certain circumstances dismiss a plaintiff’s
claim for threshold nonmerits reasons without satisfying itself of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007); supra notes 207–
-09 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to Steel Co.’s “jurisdiction first” rule).
269. See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1350, at 250–55 (3d ed. 2004). Joshi and Professor Redish argue that judges should
resolve questions of standing as soon as possible, even when there are factual disputes over
standing that overlap with determinative questions on the merits. Redish & Joshi, supra note 195,
at 1388. I am not sure I would push so hard to have judges decide such overlapping questions. But
I agree with them that courts should not pretermit standing completely, which is what the oneplaintiff rule does.
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standing of other parties requires further factual or legal development.
A ruling that at least one party has standing may well be enough to
encourage the other plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their claims or
cause the defendant to settle the case. Knowing that a ruling on only
one plaintiff’s standing could have such effects on the parties, a
settlement-minded district judge might telegraph during a hearing or
status conference that such a ruling is forthcoming. A further bit of
flexibility comes from the fact that an initial ruling on standing that is
made with only limited time and information, such as when ruling on
interim relief, can be revisited later.270
4. The Special Case of Class Actions. Recall the dispute over
whether absent class members must have standing.271 Despite the
constitutional garb in which the issue is often clothed, most of the issues
surrounding the standing of class members are actually better
understood as questions about whether a class should be certified and
how the class should be defined, questions that involve Rule 23 and
substantive law more than they involve Article III.272
Consider a damages case in which a class alleges that the
defendant misrepresented the features of a product. If the proposed
class is to be defined as all purchasers of the product, then the
defendant might object that the proposed class would violate Article
III because some members were not injured by the defendant’s
misrepresentations.273 But suppose that the substantive law effectively
presumes reliance through a representation’s effect on the market
price, as in “fraud on the market” securities cases.274 Or suppose that
all members of the class were exposed to the same objectively
deceptive representations about the product and that an individual
plaintiff could win under a state consumer protection law without

270. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 2003)
(ruling that the district court should have revisited its initial ruling on standing after further factual
development).
271. See supra Part I.B.1.
272. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 67, § 2:3 (explaining that questions about the standing of
class members have caused confusion in the courts and that “[m]ost courts concerned about the
standing of absent class members are in fact concerned about whether the class is properly
defined”).
273. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gutierrez, 136 S. Ct. 1512
(2016) (No. 14-1230), 2015 WL 1642015 (presenting an argument along these lines).
274. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–47 (1988).
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testifying that he or she actually relied on the representations.275 In
both of those cases, the defendant does not have a good Article III
standing argument, because the substantive law controls the elements
of the claim.276 Consider by way of contrast a scenario in which actual
reliance is an element of the claim and varying oral representations
were made by hundreds of individual salespeople. In that case, the
defendant has a good argument against certification of a class—
because the variations in the putative class members’ circumstances
make certification improper in light of Rule 23’s requirements of
commonality, typicality, and predominance.277
Or take the case of a group of purchasers of a defectively designed
or manufactured product that has manifested its defect in only a small
number of cases. The proposed class is composed of all purchasers of
the product. The defendant might assert an Article III objection
because the class contains “uninjured” members. But, again, whether
purchasers are injured depends on the applicable substantive law,
which could require only the purchase of a product containing a valueimpairing defect despite absence of manifestation. If the substantive
law instead requires further injury beyond purchase of the product and
purchasers have varying experiences with the product, then a class
composed of all purchasers is probably inappropriate. A more
narrowly defined class could be perfectly acceptable on Article III and
Rule 23 grounds.
The controversy over the one-plaintiff rule has mostly arisen in
class actions in which damages are sought. Other types of cases, such
as Rule 23(b)(2) injunction class actions, should present less difficulty.
In a school-desegregation case, to pick a classic 23(b)(2) scenario, all
of the plaintiffs are relevantly affected by the defendant’s actions in the
same way, so one brief standing analysis could easily cover all of the
plaintiffs. That Article III requires all plaintiffs to have standing does
not, however, mean that Article III requires that all plaintiffs in a case
have the same injury. If, to use another example, different categories
of prisoners are affected by different prison deficiencies, then the
proper course of action might be to have multiple classes or subclasses

275. See, e.g., In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 38–41 (Cal. 2009).
276. The Supreme Court could limit legislatures’ ability to define such claims (on Article III
or due process grounds), but in that case no plaintiff would be able to sue on such a claim, whether
individually or as a class representative or as a class member. The one-plaintiff rule would not be
involved.
277. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3), (b)(3).
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with separate representatives. But that result is required, if it is
required at all, by Rule 23 rather than by Article III.278
5. The Special Case of Prudential Standing. In addition to the
requirements of Article III, there are “judicially self-imposed,”
“prudential” limits on standing.279 As compared to the Article III
standing requirements, the prudential requirements are avowedly
more flexible and more responsive to the demands of good sense under
the circumstances.280 Although the one-plaintiff rule is not appropriate
when it comes to Article III standing, it is acceptable for at least some
kinds of prudential standing.
An example of the use of the one-plaintiff rule to bypass an
inquiry into prudential standing comes from Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.281 In that case, a
housing developer’s plan to build a low- and moderate-income housing
project was thwarted by a local government’s zoning decision. The
developer satisfied the constitutional standing requirements.282 One of
the developer’s claims was that the government’s zoning decision was
unconstitutionally arbitrary and irrational.283 The more promising
claim, however, was that the zoning decision was racially
discriminatory, and that was a claim that the developer, as a corporate
entity with no racial identity, could not raise on its own behalf.284 Were
the developer the only plaintiff, the Court would need to consider
whether, despite the prudential rule disfavoring third-party standing,
the developer should nonetheless be allowed to raise the equalprotection rights of its prospective minority tenants. But the Court did
not need to undertake that prudential standing analysis. The Court had
before it “at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated
standing to assert these [equal-protection] rights as his own”—namely,
an African-American co-plaintiff interested in living in the planned
development.285 Satisfied that the constitutional and prudential

278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (providing for subclasses); see also 4 RUBINSTEIN, supra note
67, § 4:34 (discussing whether “cohesiveness” is required in (b)(2) class actions).
279. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984).
280. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686–89 (2013); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 193–94 (1976).
281. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
282. Id. at 261.
283. Id. at 263 (citing, inter alia, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
284. Id. at 263.
285. Id. at 263–64. In addition, and more problematically, the Court in Village of Arlington
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prerequisites were satisfied, the Court then reached the merits and
rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.286
The Court’s decision to bypass the developer’s prudential standing
was permissible even under the theory urged in this Article. The policy
considerations that animate the usual limitations on third-party
standing—in particular, worries about unnecessary judicial decisions
and lack of concrete adverseness287—had no application in the case at
hand. Indeed, in light of the flexible nature of the prudential standing
limitations, courts facing multiple-plaintiff cases with third-party
standing issues could go further than just bypassing the prudential
analysis for extra plaintiffs. Instead, a court might justifiably decide
that all plaintiffs affirmatively satisfy the prudential requirements
because one plaintiff satisfies them, as long as the extra plaintiffs’
presence in the case would not add any complications.
The example above concerns the third-party standing strand of
prudential standing; the analysis for other forms of prudential standing
is different, if indeed those other forms still exist. The Supreme Court
recently held that the supposedly prudential doctrine requiring that a
plaintiff fall within the “zone of interests” protected by a statute is not
a standing doctrine at all, prudential or otherwise, but is instead just
the merits question whether the statute, properly construed, confers a
cause of action on a person like the plaintiff.288 So conceived, it seems
inescapable that a court cannot go ahead and grant relief to a party
without a cause of action just because a co-plaintiff does have a cause
of action. As for the “generalized grievance” branch of prudential
standing, it may be that some cases in that category actually involve
Article III abstractness problems.289 In any event, there would be little
role for the one-plaintiff rule in this kind of case, as it should not often
happen that one plaintiff’s grievance is too generalized to satisfy the
prudential requirement while a co-plaintiff’s grievance is not, for the
one-plaintiff rule applies only when the plaintiffs present the same
legal issues.290

Heights also assumed that still other plaintiffs had standing, this time apparently of the Article III
variety. Id. at 264 n.9.
286. Id. at 270.
287. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 59, § 3531.9, at 662–72 (describing the policies
behind the prudential rule against raising the rights of others).
288. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 (2014).
289. See id. at 1387 n.3.
290. See supra Part I.B.3.
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IV. HOW THIS MISTAKE HAPPENED (AND WHAT IT REVEALS)
If the one-plaintiff rule is so wrong, how did it come to seem so
right to so many courts, with only a few courts questioning it? Some
explanations have already surfaced: the Supreme Court has never
really thought the issue through, and the rule is usually applied in cases
in which its consequences are not immediately visible to courts,
especially for appellate courts removed from the practicalities of
remedies.291 Beyond those general explanations, there are a few factors
that help to explain why the one-plaintiff rule in particular could arise.
The spread of the one-plaintiff rule can plausibly be explained as the
result of two kinds of factors, one material and one ideological. More
specifically, the fault lies with the incentives of courts and litigants on
the one hand and with problematic features of our contemporary legal
culture on the other.
A. Institutional Incentives
Part of the explanation for the one-plaintiff rule’s advent and
persistence is that actors in the legal system have some incentives to
perpetuate it and too few incentives to correct it.
1. Judicial Self-Interest. The one-plaintiff rule serves the interests
of courts, though it does so differently for the Supreme Court and the
lower courts. For all of the Supreme Court’s talk about the role of
constitutional standing as a “fundamental,” “crucial,” irreducible
restriction on judicial power,292 the Court’s actions show that its greater
interest—at least when it comes to its own docket—is to pronounce on
the pressing legal issues of the day. The cases in which the Supreme
Court has invoked the one-plaintiff rule have almost never been only
about standing. Rather, the cases have discussed standing on the way
to resolving the merits issue that attracted the Court’s attention, often
a merits issue involving sensitive matters like abortion or race. When
one is focused on resolving the merits of a great public controversy, it
must be tempting indeed to sidestep thorny questions of standing that
do not seem to make a practical difference to the impact of the ruling.293

291. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
292. E.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
293. Cf. H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE 107 (1991) (noting that the Court sometimes
“skip[s] over jurisdictional problems quite cavalierly” rather than addressing them or dismissing
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Lower courts, for their part, labor under a heavy workload; they
cannot simply deny certiorari as a way of managing their dockets.294 For
them, there are obvious and understandable incentives to avoid
undertaking difficult, time-consuming inquiries, especially when it
appears that resolution of an issue will not affect the outcome on the
merits.295 In various contexts, therefore, the lower courts have sought
decisionmaking shortcuts even when the Supreme Court has tried to
prohibit them.296 Through the one-plaintiff rule, the Supreme Court has
officially licensed a shortcut, so it is not surprising to see the lower
courts embrace it with gusto.
2. Litigants’ Incentives To Disregard Standing. The typical case in
which the one-plaintiff rule is invoked is one in which plaintiffs
challenge the legality of some governmental policy and seek
declaratory and injunctive relief. Governmental defendants in such
scenarios often lack the incentive to challenge plaintiffs’ standing at all,
let alone the standing of additional plaintiffs when one plaintiff has
standing.
Consider the situation in which all plaintiffs in a given case may
well lack standing but some potential plaintiffs somewhere probably
have it. In King v. Burwell, the 2015 case challenging the availability of
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act, there were serious doubts
about the standing of most of the plaintiffs, perhaps all of them.297 Let
us suppose that careful investigation would have shown that none of
the plaintiffs had standing. Still, the government would have little
incentive to seek dismissal on that ground. Plenty of other potential
plaintiffs throughout the country certainly had standing to challenge

certiorari as improvidently granted).
294. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851,
865–68 (2014).
295. Cf. Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52
VAND. L. REV. 235, 305–14 (1999) (discussing factors that contributed to the popularity of
hypothetical jurisdiction).
296. See, e.g., Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 321–22 (1st Cir. 2003). The court in Campiti
explained:
Only as a last resort should the circuit courts read Supreme Court decisions to
create . . . mandatory [sequencing] priorities. A circuit court judge may, in an average
circuit, be responsible for 50 full-scale opinions a year and may vote on several hundred
merits cases. . . . Anything that precludes judges from taking the shortest distance to a
result impairs their ability to give truly difficult cases the time they require.
Id.
297. See Bagley, supra note 12; Weiner, supra note 12.
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the subsidies, and, win or lose, the government had an interest in
obtaining the Supreme Court’s definitive resolution of the subsidies’
legality.
Even more clearly, government defendants ordinarily have little
or no incentive to seek dismissal of uninjured plaintiffs when at least
one plaintiff clearly has standing. That is because the government will
often give the benefit of a pro-plaintiff ruling to all persons, whether
they were parties or not. That is most obviously the case when the
decision comes from the Supreme Court. Today it is only barely
conceivable that government officials would treat a Supreme Court
decision as applicable only to the named plaintiffs while continuing to
act on their own contrary understanding of the law as to all other
persons similarly situated.298 Even when a decision comes from a lower
court, government officials will often acquiesce in rulings that they (at
least officially) opposed, choosing to give the ruling a power not
required by its judgment, which is limited to the parties, or even by its
precedential effect, which is especially limited for district court
decisions.299 Government officials may act this way for a variety of
reasons: because they find the court’s reasoning convincing, because
they predict that future cases will come out the same way, because they
misunderstand the limited force of the decision, or because they wish
to use the court’s ruling as an excuse to let them follow preferences that
differ from their constituents’ wishes.
Now, to be sure, the incentives to challenge standing are very
different in certain other contexts. In class actions seeking damages,
defendants have a strong incentive to litigate vigorously on all fronts,
including by casting their objections in constitutional and jurisdictional
terms so as to make them seem more urgent. And so it is not surprising
that the one-plaintiff rule has encountered opposition in the class

298. But see William Baude, Could Obama Bypass the Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES, March
17, 2015, at A27 (arguing that the Obama administration was not required to obey a potential
adverse ruling in King v. Burwell, and should not do so, with respect to people besides the
plaintiffs in the case). What is much more common is for actors who dislike a Supreme Court
ruling to give the Court’s holding a narrow scope even if they do not question the decision’s
applicability beyond the parties.
299. See, e.g., Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 149, at 257–72 (discussing state and local
officials’ voluntary compliance with lower court rulings on same-sex marriage); cf. Galvan v.
Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261–62 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that class certification was properly
denied as unnecessary where the government defendant would apply the ruling to all persons
similarly situated).
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context, as discussed earlier.300
B. Culture
The development of the one-plaintiff rule also reflects and reveals
certain features of contemporary legal culture, more specifically
certain views about the nature of judicial power and our tendency to
take the Supreme Court as the model for all courts.
The success of the one-plaintiff rule reflects the ascendance of a
particular view of the judicial role. Academic debate still rages over the
desirability of different versions of judicial supremacy on the one hand
and departmentalism on the other.301 The basic question in that debate
involves the power of a judicial ruling, rooted in a dispute between
particular parties, to settle the law for all persons and places. Despite
the continuing academic debate, judicial supremacy today controls
most of the territory, especially in the minds of judges, such that the
question is just how far it will triumph. Similarly, it is widely
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has been moving ever closer to
embodying the law-declaration model of the judicial function and
eschewing the more modest dispute-resolution function.302 The Court
accordingly cares little for the particulars of the factual circumstances
and potential remedies applicable to the specific litigants before it. The
joint rise of judicial supremacy and the law-declaration model means
that the Supreme Court promulgates directives on national law that are
regarded as final and binding with respect to all potential disputes
within their scope. Both of these developments have in common the
erosion of the distinction between party and nonparty status. The oneplaintiff rule, as already observed, relies on the breakdown of that same
distinction.303 If parties and nonparties alike are bound or benefitted by
a decision announcing national law, it makes little sense to be careful

300. Supra Part I.B.1.
301. See, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Supremacy vs. Departmentalism, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1433 (2017).
302. See Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901,
1952–53 (2016); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2012); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case
for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56–59 (2009) (arguing that law declaration is the
proper approach for the modern Supreme Court); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of
the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 432–38 (describing the Supreme Court’s
“Olympian” posture). For further discussion of these two aspects of adjudication, see supra notes
118–20 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part II.
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about sorting the one from the other.
That the one-plaintiff rule should go unquestioned in the Supreme
Court is not especially surprising given the Court’s lawmaking role,
but, in the nature of things, the vast majority of cases invoking the rule
come from the lower courts. In the lower courts, the distinction
between party and nonparty is more consequential because the
precedential effect of lower court rulings is geographically limited or
nonexistent.304 The one-plaintiff rule should therefore be more
obviously problematic in those courts. That the one-plaintiff rule has
been embraced even in the lower courts suggests that the lower courts
increasingly see their role in law-declaration terms.
The nearly unquestioned acceptance of the one-plaintiff rule is of
a piece with other developments signaling the relative erosion of the
dispute-resolution model in the lower courts. The use of the oneplaintiff rule dovetails, for example, with the relatively recent practice
of district courts regularly granting nationwide injunctions barring the
federal government from enforcing a statute or policy against any
person anywhere in the country.305 More generally, it has become
common to hear talk of lower courts “striking down” a law in whole or
in part as a remedy for a constitutional defect.306 It would be more
precise, not to mention judicially modest, to say that a court has held
that a law cannot validly be applied to the plaintiff(s) before the court.
Commentators have long observed that any public-law case before the
Supreme Court is, even when prosecuted by a single plaintiff,
functionally similar to a class action.307 The one-plaintiff rule is
symptomatic of the slide toward a world in which all cases against the
government have this class-like cast, even in the district courts.
CONCLUSION
The one-plaintiff rule has been accepted into the mainstream of
federal practice with little notice. It is understandable that the rule
should spread, for its effects are often hard to see and, partly for that

304. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text (describing and criticizing this practice).
306. See Bray, supra note 16 (manuscript at 43–44) (observing this tendency and linking it to
the rise of nationwide injunctions); cf. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 738, 755–57 (2010) (distinguishing between the historic concept of displacing repugnant law
and the modern notion of striking down law).
307. See Miller, supra note 122, at 574.
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reason, litigants and courts often have little incentive to object to the
rule. Further, the rule’s acceptance makes sense when one considers
that it stands comfortably alongside other relatively recent
developments, like routine nationwide injunctions, that reflect and
reinforce notions of judicial power that emphasize law declaration over
retail-level dispute resolution. But even if the one-plaintiff rule’s
acceptance is understandable, the rule is wrong, and, if one looks more
closely, it is wrong in consequential ways. Courts should stop using it.
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APPENDIX: SUPREME COURT CASES INVOKING THE ONE-PLAINTIFF
RULE

Case name and citation

Did parties granted
supplemental standing
win308 on the merits in
the Supreme Court?

Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017)

N/A

Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446–47 (2009)

Yes

Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553
U.S. 181, 189 n.7 (2008)

No

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498
(2007)

Yes

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)

No

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 n.1
(2005) (mootness)

Yes

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003)

Yes

Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 n.1
(2002)

No

Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330 (1999)

Yes

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431
n.19 (1998)

Yes

308
A “win” includes cases in which the supplemental-standing parties prevailed in part, even if
they also lost in part. Town of Chester is the only case in which the Court considered only standing
and not the merits.
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Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584 (1992)

Yes

Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 719
(1990)

Yes

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 n.4
(1988)

No

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620 n.15
(1988)

Yes

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986)

Yes

Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S.
312, 319 n.3 (1984)

No

Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v.
Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 305
(1983)

Yes

Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 403 n.22 (1982)

No

Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S.
151, 160 (1981)

No

Babbitt v. United Farm Works Nat’l Union,
442 U.S. 289, 299 n.11 (1979)

No

Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S.
371, 377 n.14 (1978)

No

Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,
682 (1977)

Yes

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 595 n.14 (1977)

No

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977)

No

Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 139 n.9 (1976)

No
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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12 (1976)

Yes

Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 44
(1974)

No

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973)

Yes

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 n.5 (1964)

Yes

